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ABSTRACT 
 Fire service agencies struggle to receive and use relevant, agency-specific 
intelligence, which hampers their ability to prevent attacks, protect the community, 
mitigate an attack’s impact, respond safely, and recover from such events. This thesis 
presents the intelligence requirements necessary to support the fire service and specifies 
how the fire service can use intelligence to guide strategic policy development, 
operational planning, and tactical decision-making. It employed a qualitative gap 
analysis, using a 15-question survey of fire service personnel, to compare the current 
state of the fire service intelligence apparatus with a desired future state. This thesis also 
used case analysis to identify current intelligence products to understand how well they 
support strategic, operational, and tactical decisions. This thesis identifies intelligence 
gaps from a broader fire-service audience and offers a holistic set of recommendations, 
thus contributing to intelligence research. The gaps involve collaborating with law 
enforcement on intelligence, establishing intelligence requirements to better support the 
fire service, handling sensitive information, and using finished intelligence for decision-
making. This thesis recommends identifying and distributing intelligence requirements to 
the fire service, developing training and policy guidance on intelligence handling, and 
creating a joint intelligence guide. 
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Fire service agencies struggle to receive relevant, agency-specific intelligence, 
which hampers their ability to prevent adversarial attacks, protect the community, mitigate 
the impact, respond safely, and recover from such events. Accordingly, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) directed the president of the United 
States to establish the Information Sharing Environment, which “provides and facilitates 
the means for sharing terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, State, local, 
and tribal entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and 
technologies.”1 The goal of IRTPA was to eliminate the intelligence community’s 
information and intelligence gaps between levels of governments that failed to provide the 
intelligence necessary to prepare for and prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
This thesis identifies the intelligence requirements needed to support the fire service 
and describes how the fire service can use intelligence to guide strategic policy 
development, operational planning, and tactical decision-making. Additionally, this thesis 
uses qualitative gap analysis to compare the current state of the fire service intelligence 
apparatus with a desired future state.2 This method guided the development of 
recommendations by analyzing processes, practices, structures, and missing strategies.3 As 
part of the analysis, I conducted a survey of fire service members through the International 
Association of Fire Chiefs and the Fire Service Section of the National Fire Protection 
Association. The survey aimed to identify the current intelligence requirements and uses 
of intelligence to inform decision-making.  
Additionally, this research analyzed current intelligence products developed by the 
Chicago Fire Department’s Tactical Operations Intelligence Center, the New York City 
Fire Department’s Watchline, and the National Capital Region Threat Intelligence 
 
1 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, §1016, 118 Stat. 
3665 (2004), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/RelatedContent_documents/Intelligence_
Reform_Act.pdf. 




Consortium’s first responder bulletin. The analysis identified the current state of 
intelligence products to gain an understanding of how well the products support strategic, 
operational, and tactical decision-making. 
To guide the gap analysis, this thesis used the political, economic, sociocultural, 
technological, environmental, legal (PESTEL) framework, facilitating the analysis of 
numerous factors for a more comprehensive study. This thesis used the results to develop 
a set of recommendations, including the creation of a fire service intelligence requirements 
document and a joint intelligence guide for first response organizations. 
Demographically, respondents represented career, volunteer, and combination 
departments, as well as a state fire academy, a paid on-call agency, and a state forestry 
agency. Additionally, participants represented various sized fire departments from every 
geographic region in the United States. Identifying shortcomings in fire service intelligence 
practices as a whole made the representation from different types, sizes, and geographic 
regions vital to the development of solutions that most departments can use. 
The survey data revealed several effective intelligence practices. First, a majority 
of participants reported receiving intelligence from at least one source, with several 
reporting multiple sources. The most prevalent sources were state or local fusion centers, 
police intelligence units, the Homeland Security Information Network, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s JTTFs. To a lesser extent, others highlighted agency use of 
internally created intelligence, arson task forces, technical resources for incident 
prevention, bomb and arson tracking systems, and the Interagency Fire Intelligence 
Exchange. These findings challenge the work of earlier researchers who suggested that the 
fire service lacked access to intelligence products because of limited security clearances or 
other reasons.4 Second, several participants noted successful integration by their agencies 
with state or local fusion centers, with some having a fire service representative or terrorism 
liaison officer assigned as well. Additionally, 88.24 percent of participants recognized that 
their departments receive intelligence of some value—despite data that suggest 52 percent 
 
4 Thomas A. Robson, “A Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in the Fire 
Service” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 2, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4913. 
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of fire agencies perceive intelligence providers as unaware of fire service intelligence 
requirements. 
On the other hand, barriers to information sharing persist within fire service 
agencies and between their law enforcement counterparts. Internally, fire service agencies 
withhold information from the rank and file, disseminating it only to high-ranking 
personnel. Regarding law enforcement, many survey participants highlighted a lack of trust 
between the fire service and law enforcement as an important information-sharing barrier. 
The problem endures despite several guidance documents recognizing the fire service as 
an equal and fully trusted partner.5 Additionally, fire service agencies advised that they do 
not receive the same type of intelligence as law enforcement does, suggesting that decision-
makers value it less. Likewise, the fire service interaction with fusion centers remains 
fragmented, another notable weakness. In particular, participants from Washington State 
and New York underscored that the fire service has been left out of the information-sharing 
loop altogether. Still, others stated their fusion centers deal mainly with criminal issues 
such as drug trafficking. 
Collaborating with law enforcement on intelligence processes, establishing 
intelligence requirements to better support the fire service, handling sensitive information, 
and using finished intelligence for decision-making represent the key findings of this thesis. 
As a result of the study, the fire service overwhelmingly suggests that intelligence and 
operational planning must be a collaborative effort. Numerous participants proposed 
reserving a seat at the table for fire service agencies to engage in intelligence and 
information-sharing initiatives. Furthermore, participants suggested tying in intelligence 
activities with integrated response planning for events that may affect their jurisdictions. 
The survey uncovered several interrelated fire service requirements. First, fire 
service agencies argued that the intelligence they do receive lacks relevance, timeliness, 
and coordination between fire and law enforcement agencies. Second, participants claimed 
that intelligence agencies are not aware of fire service intelligence needs. These claims 
 
5 Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and 
Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (Washington, DC: White House, 2007), 
3, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a473664.pdf. 
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raise concern because they reveal misperceptions within the fire service about intelligence 
requirements. Additionally, the survey revealed some confusion over intelligence 
requirements for standing information needs and strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 
An associated concern was the lack of understanding of the handling requirements for 
sensitive information, as many agencies do not have an information security officer 
position. Several participants highlighted security concerns about leaks of sensitive 
information to the general public. 
Regarding the use of finished intelligence, participants identified several 
shortcomings in the survey. First, participants pointed out that fire service members need 
additional training in how to understand, interpret, and act on intelligence. Second, 
participants suggested that the overabundance of information drowns out the more 
pertinent details. Additionally, participants stressed the need to practice using intelligence 
in training scenarios to improve understanding. Furthermore, participants recognized that 
without knowing how to use intelligence, fire personnel could respond blindly to incidents 
that might have grave consequences. 
According to Thomas Robson, “The ability of the fire service to execute its sworn 
duty to protect life and property in the local community, as well as, to the extent possible, 
protect the firefighters who serve there from the consequences of terrorism, is dependent 
on the efficient usage of intelligence.”6 As such, intelligence supports mission-critical 
decisions at all levels of fire service organizations. More specifically, intelligence aims to 
inform long-range strategic planning, gain an understanding of threats and their 
implications for the organization, and protect the lives of personnel operating on the 
ground. Given the importance of intelligence, this thesis provides recommendations for the 
three most critical issues identified in the survey and analysis of professed intelligence 
problems: determining intelligence requirements, handling sensitive information, and more 
effectively collaborating with law enforcement in developing intelligence products.  
 
6 Robson, “Burning Need to Know,” 14. 
xix 
1. The International Association of Fire Chiefs should identify and distribute 
a list of baseline fire service intelligence requirements to all fire service 
organizations for submission to their intelligence producers. 
2. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice 
should develop a training brief and policy guidance on intelligence-
handling requirements and operational security. 
3. The Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, 
International Association of Fire Chiefs, and International Association of 
Chiefs of Police should develop a joint intelligence guide for use by fire, 
law enforcement, emergency medical services, and other first response 
agencies.  
In sum, identifying and distributing baseline intelligence requirements to fire 
service agencies will ensure the received intelligence is timely and relevant to support 
decision-making at all levels of fire service organizations. Also, training on handling 
sensitive information and internal security policies may eliminate barriers to information 
sharing between the fire service and law enforcement. Finally, developing a joint planning 
doctrine and guide will allow for more effective coordination and collaboration at the local 
level to ensure the completion of homeland security missions in the most effective and 
efficient ways possible. 
xx 
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Fire service agencies struggle to receive and utilize relevant, agency-specific 
intelligence, which affects their ability to prevent adversarial attacks, protect the 
community, mitigate the impact, respond safely, and recover from such events. 
Accordingly, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) 
directed the president of the United States to establish the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE), which “provides and facilitates the means for sharing terrorism 
information among all appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, and the private 
sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies.”1 The goal of IRTPA was to 
eliminate the Intelligence Community (IC)’s information and intelligence gaps between 
levels of governments that failed to provide the intelligence necessary to prepare for and 
prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
To comply with the information-sharing mandates, the ISE leveraged existing 
mechanisms across the government. One such mechanism was the expanding network of 
state and local fusion centers. A fusion center is a cooperative group of agencies that work 
to prevent terrorist acts by pooling their resources and expertise to provide actionable 
intelligence to appropriate state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies (SLTT).2 The latter 
include law enforcement, public health, emergency medical services, and the fire service, 
among others. The fusion center is designed to promote a two-way exchange of information 
with SLTT agencies. The government considers SLTT agencies as contributors, 
collaborators, and consumers of intelligence information, of which the fire service plays a 
significant role. In turn, fire service agencies use intelligence to drive strategic, operational, 
and tactical decision-making.  
 
1 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, §1016, 118 Stat. 
3665 (2004), https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/RelatedContent_documents/Intelligence_
Reform_Act.pdf. 
2 Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing 
and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era (Washington, DC: Department of Justice and 
Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 2, https://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/d/fusion_center_guidelines.
pdf. 
2 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the intelligence requirements necessary to provide the fire 
service direct support to inform strategic, operational, and tactical 
decision-making? 
2. How can the fire service use intelligence to guide strategic policy 
development, operational planning, and tactical decision-making? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review explores the growing body of academic literature related to 
the fire service and the broader intelligence enterprise. The first section discusses 
government and organizational reports that serve as foundational information for the 
domestic intelligence enterprise. The second section analyzes academic research and 
government reports regarding the role of fusion centers in domestic intelligence generally, 
and fire service intelligence more specifically. The third section explores academic 
research and government reports that outline the current body of knowledge regarding the 
Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise.  
1. Intelligence Community and Information Sharing Environment 
The 9/11 Commission Report and the Intelligence Reform Act fueled the 
reorganization of the IC and the development of the ISE to prevent surprise attacks by 
aligning all IC agencies. The 9/11 Commission recognized a lack of organization among 
the IC and six problems before and after 9/11: structural barriers to joint work, management 
division, lack of common practices and standards, a limited ability to establish priorities, 
secrecy, and too many roles concentrated in one leadership position.3 The Intelligence 
Reform Act sought to eliminate the systemic barriers by giving the president the authority 
to develop the ISE and appoint a director of national intelligence.4  
 
3 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2004), 408–10, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc123526/. 
4 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 
3 
Erik Dahl suggests that terrorism challenged the IC well before 9/11.5 To support 
his claim, he argues that “the intelligence community is limited in its ability to use 
traditional tools and techniques to gain insight into terrorist intentions and capabilities.”6 
Furthermore, Dahl recognizes that there has been very little academic research on the 
importance of intelligence in combatting terrorism.7 Dahl also advocates the need for 
actionable intelligence and policymaker action as essential elements to prevent surprise 
attacks.8  
Likewise, Amy Zegart attributes this IC limitation to organizational issues within 
and among IC agencies before 9/11. More specifically, Zegart suggests that decades-old 
structural weaknesses, misaligned incentives and rewards, and resistance to new 
technologies worsened organizational deficiencies.9 Zegart contends that since 9/11, the 
government and IC have undergone several adaptation failures.10 She further suggests that 
bickering policymakers and posturing by the Department of Defense have weakened the 
IRTPA and led to continued shortcomings of the IC.11  
Mark Lowenthal echoes the common theme of organizational issues, with the 
director of national intelligence having to contend with the discrepancy between his 
responsibilities and authority over intelligence agencies.12 Essentially, the director of 
national intelligence has responsibility for the IC but does not have jurisdiction over the 
individual agencies. Lowenthal also points out that 80 percent of the IC is under the control 
of the secretary of defense.13  
 
5 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 17. 
6 Dahl, 17. 
7 Dahl, 17. 
8 Dahl, 20. 
9 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 4. 
10 Zegart, 170. 
11 Zegart, 170–82. 
12 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 7th ed. (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2017), 
41. 
13 Lowenthal, 43. 
4 
Despite claims of improvements to information sharing in government documents, 
such sharing continues to pose challenges. The Review of the Domestic Sharing of 
Counterterrorism Information suggests that the implementation of the nation’s 
information-sharing strategy has been patchy.14 Additionally, the report finds, “The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Intelligence Enterprise is not as effective and 
valuable to the IC as it could be.”15 Other challenges include a counterterrorism mission 
overlap between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS, large geographic 
regions, a lack of clear vision, and a focus on sustainment over enhancement.16 
The academic literature and the government review concur on the many structural 
impediments and organizational deficiencies within the IC. The continued problems within 
the IC limit the utility of such intelligence products. 
2. Fusion Centers 
The literature regarding fusion centers identifies connections from the IC to state 
and local agencies, with fusion centers serving as the hub. It informs the reader of the 
design and makeup of fusion centers and highlights several legal challenges facing fusion 
center coordinators. Furthermore, the research firmly establishes the role of the fire service 
within fusion centers. Unfortunately, the actual engagement of fusion centers with local 
agencies is sporadic. The literature is limited in that it highlights methods for integration, 
but it stops short of informing the fire service on how to use finished intelligence.  
The 2010 “Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers” appendix by the 
Department of Justice represents the first and only comprehensive government document 
that advocates fire service intelligence integration. The Department of Justice suggests that 
 
14 Offices of the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, 
and Department of Justice, Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information (Washington, 
DC: Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and 
Department of Justice, March 2017), i, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Domestic_
Sharing_Counterterrorism_Information_Report.pdf. 
15 Offices of the Inspectors General, 9. 
16 Offices of the Inspectors General, 8–9. 
5 
the fire service’s subject-matter expertise can help fusion centers meet their capabilities.17 
Specifically, the document proposes that the fire service report criminal acts and provide 
input on risk assessments to achieve fusion center goals.18 Additionally, it spells out the 
need for intelligence to provide situational awareness to emergency personnel.19 However, 
the Department of Justice highlights fire service contributions to fusion centers rather than 
fusion center support to the fire service. Nevertheless, citing the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing, Castro Garcia, Matei, and Bruneau suggest, “Fusion centers serve as 
the primary focal points within states and localities for the receipt and sharing of 
information on terrorism.”20  
Furthermore, the 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report by DHS 
asserts, “Fusion centers are uniquely situated to enhance the national threat picture and 
enable local officials to better protect their communities from a variety of threats.”21 
Accordingly, organizations that identify their intelligence needs for fusion centers receive 
the maximum benefit. Similarly, the report proposes that fusion centers’ access to unique 
systems and local personnel allows for a complete threat picture.22 DHS further 
recommends that “fusion center services must be timely and tailored to both the standing 
and emergent needs of requestors sufficient to accomplish desired end states and 
deliverables.”23 Additionally, the report offers that intelligence requirements govern the 
information provided by fusion centers to state and local jurisdictions. The specific 
 
17 Department of Justice, “Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers” (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 
2010), 2. 
18 Department of Justice, 2. 
19 Department of Justice, 3. 
20 Andres de Castro Garcia, Florina Cristiana Matei, and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Combatting Terrorism 
through Fusion Centers: Useful Lessons from Other Experiences?” International Journal of Intelligence 
and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 4 (2017): 733, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2017.1297119. 
21 Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), v, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/2013%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
22 Department of Homeland Security, 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), i, https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/
oversight-groups/sltps-pac/national-network-of-fusion-centers-2015.pdf. 
23 Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers, 26. 
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requirements may take the form of standing information needs, strategic intelligence, 
operational intelligence, and tactical intelligence.  
Recent academic studies have evaluated the efficacy of fusion centers in supporting 
fire service intelligence needs. Scott Goldstein contends that fusion centers are responsible 
for the analysis and distribution of intelligence.24 Additionally, he suggests, “Fire and EMS 
[emergency medical services] responders have had little involvement with fusion center 
operations, and this directly impacts the country’s safety.”25 Thomas Richardson supports 
Goldstein’s claim in suggesting that fire service involvement in intelligence is slow and 
challenging.26 Moreover, Goldstein offers that fire and EMS personnel are inconsistent in 
their use of information in the face of expanding roles.27 Ultimately, Goldstein finds that 
using fire and EMS agencies could increase the effectiveness of fusion centers.28 Thus, 
while everyone agrees that fusion centers can support fire service intelligence, barriers on 
the fire service side hamper such efforts. 
Alternatively, Richardson suggests that the intelligence-sharing gap is between fire 
and law enforcement, not necessarily between fusion centers and the fire service.29 He 
posits three reasons intelligence sharing is insufficient between fire and law: the need to 
safeguard investigations, limit the exposure of sources, and protect civil liberties.30 To 
counter these assertions, Richardson acknowledges that fire and EMS personnel 
understand how to control privileged information.31 In the end, Richardson finds that 
despite progress, dissemination of intelligence to line personnel remains inadequate.32 
 
24 Scott E. Goldstein, “Comparative Analysis of Fusion Center Outreach to Fire and EMS Agencies” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), xv, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47952. 
25 Goldstein, v. 
26 Thomas J. Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to First 
Responders in the Fire and EMS Services” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), v, http://hdl.
handle.net/10945/5137. 
27 Goldstein, “Comparative Analysis,” xv. 
28 Goldstein, xvii. 
29 Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices,” 1. 
30 Richardson, 2. 
31 Richardson, 2. 
32 Richardson, 57. 
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Although fusion centers serve as the focal point for state and local information 
sharing, numerous problems still exist. Shane Salvatore attributes these deficiencies to 
inadequate collaboration, no standard dissemination model, and a lack of focus on 
counterterrorism efforts.33 Moreover, Salvatore finds that competing mandates, the 
incorporation of all-crimes or all-hazards approaches, and the lack of mutually beneficial 
relationships create significant hurdles.34 Consequently, Regan and Monahan suggest, 
“Fusion centers that were originally oriented toward ‘counterterrorism’ have quickly 
broadened their scope to include all-crimes.”35 The implication of this shift is that fusion 
centers rarely provide for the intelligence needs of local agencies outside of law 
enforcement.  
Privacy and civil liberties proponents are more critical of the role of fusion centers 
in intelligence processes. Regan, Monahan, and Craven find that involving the private 
sector, limiting transparency, and mixing law enforcement with intelligence gathering 
cause concern for such agencies.36 Likewise, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
raises questions regarding the efficacy of fusion center activities in preventing terrorism. 
They suggest that the lack of policy and oversight may lead to manipulation in the form of 
policy shopping.37 The ACLU further indicates ambiguous lines of authority, participation 
by the private sector and the military, and excessive secrecy as encroachments on civil 
 
33 Shane A. Salvatore, “Fusion Center Challenges: Why Fusion Centers Have Failed to Meet 
Intelligence Sharing Expectations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 4, http://hdl.
handle.net/10945/58358. 
34 Salvatore, 76–77. 
35 Priscilla M. Regan and Torin Monahan, “Beyond Counterterrorism: Data Sharing, Privacy, and 
Organizational Histories of DHS Fusion Centers,” International Journal of E-Politics 4, no. 3 (2013): 10, 
https://doi.org/10.4018/jep.2013070101. 
36 Priscilla M. Regan, Torin Monahan, and Krista Craven, “Constructing the Suspicious: Data 
Production, Circulation, and Interpretation by DHS Fusion Centers,” Administration & Society 47, no. 6 
(2015): 742, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399713513141. 
37 Michael German, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 
2007), 9, https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf. 
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liberties.38 Monahan and Palmer support the claims of the ACLU while adding that mission 
creep is also a serious concern.39 
Despite being recognized as the focal point for dissemination of information to state 
and local agencies, fire and EMS integration continues to be challenging. Common themes 
in associated literature suggest that fusion centers work best with appropriate collaboration 
and by tailoring the information to the needs of said partners. Unfortunately, law 
enforcement does not trust its counterparts with sensitive information, and fire and EMS 
services do not use intelligence consistently.40 Although these issues might seem only to 
involve fire and EMS agencies, other local agencies that rely on fusion centers for their 
intelligence needs should share this concern.  
3. Local Intelligence-Led Public Safety Initiatives 
A growing body of research addresses improving local public safety operations 
with the incorporation of intelligence processes. According to the National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, the expansion of intelligence in state 
and local agencies corresponds with growing sentiment by the IC that intelligence enhances 
the value of local agencies.41 The study finds that the local level needs actionable 
intelligence because terrorism is a local event.42 Other significant findings suggest that 
organizational leadership, viable strategic intelligence, and better leveraging of intelligence 
networks will improve intelligence use at the local level.43 Rosemary Cloud echoes the 
need for organizational leadership in her thesis.44 Cloud states, “The future role of the fire 
 
38 German, 4–5. 
39 Torin Monahan and Neal A. Palmer, “The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers,” Security 
Dialogue 40, no. 6 (2009): 632, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010609350314. 
40 Goldstein, “Comparative Analysis,” xv. 
41 David Carter et al., Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes: Report to the Office of 
University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate (College Park, MD: National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2014), 3, https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_
UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf. 
42 Carter et al., 3. 
43 Carter et al., 15–16. 
44 Rosemary R. Cloud, “Future Role of Fire Service in Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2008), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3935. 
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service in homeland security will demand the need for progressive leadership, effective 
collaboration, intelligence engagement, and the adoption of a shifting mission that supports 
preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery of terrorist attacks.”45  
Alternatively, Rebecca Gonzales finds systemic barriers to involving the fire 
service in intelligence, and many fire service members resist the expansion of their 
responsibilities.46 Gonzales suggests culture, intergroup dynamics, and the need to 
collaborate as stumbling blocks for the fire service.47 Moreover, Gonzales finds that fire 
service leadership organizations oppose such intelligence programs, stemming from a lack 
of knowledge about how intelligence aids fire departments in meeting their missions.48 
Gonzales correctly notes that many experts believe intelligence is only for law enforcement 
as it is outside the traditional domain of the fire service.49  
4. Public Health 
Despite the challenges, numerous efforts are underway to develop locally based 
intelligence operations in public health, law enforcement, and the fire service. Public health 
agencies have struggled to gain access to information through state and local intelligence 
agencies. Cody Minks finds that among public health agencies surveyed, some favor 
integrating with fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), but they currently 
lack representation with either unit.50 Additionally, Minks suggests that information 
sharing between state agencies and local public health agencies is not improving, and no 
current plans focus on improving such sharing.51 Moreover, he finds that fusion centers do 
 
45 Cloud, v. 
46 Rebecca L. Gonzales, “Transforming Executive Fire Officers: A Paradigm Shift to Meet the 
Intelligence Needs of the 21st Century Fire Service” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 
87–88, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5157. 
47 Gonzales, 88. 
48 Gonzales, 89–90. 
49 Gonzales, 90. 
50 Cody Minks, “Hacking the Silos: Eliminating Information Barriers between Public Health and Law 
Enforcement” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 50, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58345. 
51 Minks, 51. 
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not see the added benefit of including public health agencies in fusion center operations.52 
Perhaps the fusion center’s set-up as an all-crimes center and not an all-hazards center 
explains this reluctance to embrace public health. Finally, he concludes that fusion centers 
continue to present barriers to public health integration, and little public health information 
flows into or out of fusion centers.53 
5. Law Enforcement 
According to Marilyn Peterson, “Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative 
enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and community-oriented policing and 
problem solving, which the field has considered beneficial for many years.”54 The author 
contends that officers can respond more effectively to crimes by using intelligence.55 
Additionally, Peterson proposes that law enforcement agencies benefit from the increased 
use of fusion centers.56 Carter describes two primary purposes for law enforcement 
intelligence: 1) planning and resource allocation and 2) prevention.57 Carter states that 
strategic and tactical intelligence aid officers in their prevention roles.58  
Unfortunately, law enforcement continues to distrust the fire service with 
intelligence information. Carter suggests that law enforcement is skeptical about the role 
of the fire service and unclear about what information it might share with fire service 
counterparts.59 Alternatively, Peterson notes that a lack of policies, procedures, and training 
is the main issue with law enforcement intelligence processes.60 Despite the problems, 
 
52 Minks, 56. 
53 Minks, 57. 
54 Marilyn Peterson, Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture, NCJ 210681 
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005), vii, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/
210681.pdf. 
55 Peterson, vii. 
56 Peterson, 9. 
57 David Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 
Agencies, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2004), 9, https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/
e050919201-IntelGuide_web.pdf. 
58 Carter, 9. 
59 Carter, 19. 
60 Peterson, Intelligence-Led Policing, vii. 
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Peterson submit that law enforcement needs to move away from informal practices for 
official policy.61 Moreover, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services advises 
local agencies to promote interoperability.62 Finally, Carter summarizes the benefits of this 
cooperation: “Through sharing pre-incident information and intelligence and real-time 
incident updates, situational awareness will be enhanced to support the preparedness efforts 
of both local fire departments and the DHS.”63 
6. Fire Service 
For the fire service, a large body of research highlights intelligence and information 
sharing at the local level. As the Intelligence Guide for Fire Chiefs states, “Many fire chiefs 
have struggled to identify a reliable source of terrorism threat intelligence that can address 
the specific needs of their jurisdictions and fire service operations.”64 The report also finds 
that the ISE continues to be improvised despite the possible benefits of including thousands 
of firefighters in the effort.65 Specifically, “Law enforcement [fusion] centers are not 
familiar with fire service needs and generally do not interact with fire service personnel.”66 
The most important finding is that the IC must understand the intelligence requirements 
needed by the fire service to make an informed strategic, operational, and tactical 
decision.67 
Alternatively, Robson argues that because the fire service wants to distribute 
intelligence widely, it should exploit open-source information.68 He offers that efficiently 
 
61 Peterson, vii. 
62 Robert Chapman et al., “Local Law Enforcement Responds to Terrorism Lessons in Prevention and 
Preparedness,” COPS Innovations, last updated April 5, 2002, 2, https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/
cops-w0125-pub.pdf. 
63 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence, 23. 
64 International Association of Fire Chiefs, Homeland Security: Intelligence Guide for Fire Chiefs 
(Fairfax, VA: International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2012), 3, http://the-security-institute.org/userfiles/
file/IntelGuide4FireChiefs.pdf. 
65 International Association of Fire Chiefs, 5. 
66 International Association of Fire Chiefs, 8. 
67 International Association of Fire Chiefs, 7. 
68 Thomas A. Robson, “A Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in the Fire 
Service” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 2, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4913. 
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using intelligence allows the fire service to accomplish its mission of protecting 
communities.69 Furthermore, he claims that the overall goal of utilizing intelligence is to 
save lives.70  
On the other hand, Joseph Russo recommends that before the fire service engages 
the IC, it should establish internal protocols for collecting and disseminating intelligence 
information.71 Additionally, he attests that valuable information rarely finds its way to 
operational personnel, severely limiting their situational awareness.72 Richardson supports 
this need for situational awareness with an overwhelming majority of answers to his survey 
question.73 Richardson adds that intelligence aids deployment decisions and strategic 
planning and increases the awareness of line personnel.74 Brian Heirston suggests that 
information-sharing partners need to open up culturally and politically to improve fire 
service use of intelligence to inform decision-making.75 Additionally, Kevin Harrison 
claims that absent procedures, differing technology used, and a lack of information sharing 
across missions have hampered operations in real-world incidents.76 
Despite purported improvements to information sharing, the literature shows that 
local public health, law enforcement, and fire service agencies struggle to get the 
information needed. A limiting factor of the academic writing is that very few discuss 
public health intelligence engagement. Additionally, the research offers numerous methods 
for integrating and using intelligence but provides very little empirical evidence as to the 
efficacy of information for local agencies.  
 
69 Robson, 14. 
70 Robson, 31. 
71 Joseph Russo, “Out from Under the Rock: Improving FDNY Information Sharing” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 64, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/53042. 
72 Russo, 64. 
73 Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices,” 19. 
74 Richardson, 20. 
75 Bryan Heirston, “Terrorism Prevention and Firefighters: Where Are the Information-Sharing 
Boundaries?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 82, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/
10945/4930. 
76 Kevin Harrison, “Improving Information Sharing in the NYC Emergency Response Community” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 1, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=814723. 
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis differs from the literature in that it does not seek integration, nor does it 
address organizational behavior deficiencies, as several academic papers already address 
these subjects. This thesis examines fire service intelligence requirements to improve the 
quality of information, making it more actionable for the fire service. Additionally, this 
thesis provides a practical user guide for fire service leaders detailing how to use 
intelligence once they receive it.  
Using a qualitative gap analysis model to answer the research questions, I compared 
the current fire service intelligence apparatus with the desired future state.77 This method 
aided in developing recommendations by analyzing processes, practices, structures, and 
missing strategies.78 As part of the analysis, I surveyed fire service members through the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the Fire Service Section of the 
National Fire Protection Association. The primary goal of the inquiry was to identify the 
current intelligence requirements and uses of intelligence to inform decision-making. The 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional Review Board assessed my research proposal 
and determined that it did not constitute human subjects research. 
Additionally, this research analyzed current intelligence products developed by the 
Chicago Fire Department’s Tactical Operations Intelligence Center, New York City Fire 
Department (FDNY)’s Watchline, and the National Capital Region Threat Intelligence 
Consortium’s first responder bulletin. The analysis identified the state of intelligence 
products to gain an understanding of how well the products support strategic, operational, 
and tactical functions. 
To guide the gap analysis, this thesis employed the political, economic, 
sociocultural, technological, environmental, legal (PESTEL) framework. According to 
Ovidijus Jurevivius, “PEST or PESTEL analysis is a simple and effective tool used in 
situation analysis to identify the key external (macro environment level) forces that might 
 




affect an organization.”79 The gap analysis with the PESTEL framework facilitated a more 
comprehensive evaluation. Nevertheless, because the gap analysis method does not 
identify root causes and the PESTEL forces are in constant flux, researchers must repeat 
the process. As such, researchers attempting to replicate this research must consider 
changes in political, economic, sociocultural, technological, environmental, and legal 
forces to draw the same conclusions. This thesis used information from the study to develop 
a set of recommendations, including the creation of a fire service intelligence requirements 
document and a joint intelligence guide for first response organizations.  
D. CHAPTER LAYOUT 
Chapter II explores the information-sharing gaps in the fire service. The first part 
of the chapter presents the results of a survey administered to members of the fire service. 
It then analyzes the results using a PESTEL analytical framework. Finally, the chapter 
highlights significant issues learned from the survey.  
Chapter III provides an overview of intelligence, including a working definition 
and descriptions of the intelligence cycle and intelligence types, markings, and handling 
procedures. Next, it provides an overview of the intelligence community and how it 
integrates with the fire service. It then focuses on fire service–specific guidelines, policies, 
and practices. Finally, it concludes with key takeaways from the discussion. 
Chapter IV uses case studies to evaluate the specific fire service intelligence 
products that agencies produce. The case studies assess how well agency product lines meet 
the criteria for intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For additional 
analysis, Chapter IV uses Mark Lowenthal’s framework for identifying good intelligence. 
The framework analyzes intelligence products for their timeliness, suitability, digestibility, 
and clarity regarding knowns and unknowns.80 
Chapter V synthesizes the information from the previous chapters, evaluates 
current fire intelligence support, and offers concrete recommendations for building future 
 
79 Ovidijus Jurevicius, “PEST & PESTEL Analysis,” Strategic Management Insight, February 13, 
2013, https://www.strategicmanagementinsight.com/tools/pest-pestel-analysis.html. 
80 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 214–15. 
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fire intelligence processes to serve the enterprise better. The chapter discusses aspects of 
fire service intelligence processes that work well and need to change or improve. Then, it 
details the conclusions drawn from the research with answers to the research questions. 
Finally, the chapter ends with a list of recommendations to improve fire service intelligence 
processes to inform strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making. 
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II. GAPS IN FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT, 
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES 
Fire service agencies need timely, agency-specific intelligence to prevent 
adversarial attacks, assist their communities in mitigating the impact of natural and human-
made disasters, and respond to and recover from such incidents. Yet many fire service 
agencies struggle to receive and utilize such intelligence. According to the ISE’s annual 
report, “The U.S. Government’s ability to effectively share terrorism-related information 
and other information related to multiple threat actors, as well as their networks, and then 
use that information to support a broad array of national security-related missions and 
activities is essential in protecting the homeland.”81 The fire service should receive such 
information to bolster its efforts in homeland security missions. This thesis attempts to 
identify the current state of intelligence and information sharing between the intelligence 
community and the fire service to inform strategic, operational, and tactical decision-
making.  
This chapter determines the level of information-sharing gaps in the fire service. 
The first part of the chapter presents the results of a survey conducted among members of 
the fire service. It then analyzes the results using a PESTEL analytical framework. Finally, 
this chapter highlights significant issues learned from the survey.  
A. SURVEY OVERVIEW 
The participants are members of the IAFC and the Fire Service Section of the 
National Fire Protection Association. As the goal of this thesis was to establish a practical 
use guide to inform strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making, no additional 
participants were necessary. Members of the IAFC come from all fire service ranks and all 
geographic areas of the United States. The participants responded to a series of 
demographic, yes/no, and open-ended fire service intelligence–related questions, which are 
 
81 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018 Information Sharing Environment (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018), 19, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/
2018_Information_Sharing_Environment_Annual_Report.pdf. 
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detailed in the following sections. The total number of participants was 340, as determined 
by the survey system.  
This study used LimeSurvey to develop and aggregate survey questions and 
answers. A brief description of the purpose of the survey and hyperlinks to the survey 
platform were posted on the IAFC’s KnowledgeNet and the National Fire Protection 
Association’s X-Change web portals. The intent of the survey was to identify gaps in fire 
service intelligence processes. The expected gains from the survey included identifying the 
perceived ideal state for a fire service intelligence enterprise. In addition, the survey sought 
to identify barriers to fire departments’ receiving, disseminating, and utilizing finished 
intelligence products. Finally, the survey identified intelligence requirements for fire 
service agencies.  
B. DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
1. What type of fire department is represented?  
Participants in the survey work for a variety of fire service organizations. The 
overwhelming majority of participants, 67.95 percent, identified their departments as 
career agencies. In such organizations, firefighters receive compensation and are full-time 
employees.82 Another 25.32 percent of the participants identified their agencies as 
combination fire departments. The Code of Federal Regulations defines a combination 
department as “a fire suppression agency or organization in which at least one active 
firefighter receives financial compensation for his/her services rendered on behalf of the 
department, and at least one active firefighter does not receive financial compensation.”83 
Additionally, 4.17 percent of participants work for volunteer agencies, which provide no 
financial compensation. Finally, 0.96 percent of participants identified their departments 
as “other,” which included a paid on-call agency, a state forestry agency, and a state fire 
academy. See Figure 1 for the fire agency types represented in the survey. 
 
82 Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program, 44 C.F.R. § 152.2 (2011), https://www.law.cornell.
edu/cfr/text/44/152.2. 
83 Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. 
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Figure 1. Fire Service Agencies Represented in the Survey 
2. How many personnel are there in the department? 
The participants in the survey represent agencies that differ greatly in the number 
of personnel. The most significant sub-section, 56.73 percent, represented agencies with 
100 or fewer personnel. Another 18.59 percent represented agencies with more than 400 
personnel. Additionally, 15.06 percent of participants represented agencies with 101–200 
personnel. Finally, 5.13 percent of participants represented agencies with 201–300 
personnel, and 2.88 percent represented agencies with 301–400 personnel. See Figure 2 for 
the number of personnel in the represented fire agencies.  
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Figure 2. Number of Personnel in the Represented Departments 
3. Please specify the geographic location of the department.  
Representing 31.41 percent of all fire service agencies, more respondents hailed 
from the Midwest than from any other region. Another 24.36 percent of the agencies 
represented the Northeast. Additionally, 18.59 percent of the participants represented 
departments in the Southeast. The West, Southwest, and Northwest rounded out the list 
with 9.29 percent, 8.97 percent, and 7.37 percent, respectively. Understanding the 
demographic makeup of participant agencies is essential because the aim of this thesis is 
to develop an operational guide for fire service agencies, regardless of geographic location 
or degree of intelligence integration. See Figure 3 for a breakdown by region. 
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Figure 3. Geographic Regions of the Fire Departments 
C. INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS 
1. What would the fire service role in the intelligence community look 
like? 
Establishing the ideal future state of the fire service intelligence enterprise helped 
to identify the gaps in fire service intelligence policies and practices. The first intelligence-
specific question sought to establish that foundation by asking the participants for their 
input on what role the fire service should have in the overall intelligence enterprise. The 
open-ended question solicited responses from participants in their own words. The 
participants identified three vital roles for the fire service in the intelligence enterprise—
namely, collaborator, consumer, and collector.  
a. Collaborator 
For collaboration, participants suggest that fire service agencies should have a seat 
at the table, similar to that of a unified command. For example, one participant suggested 
connecting with local, state, and federal partners to build relationships and trust to obtain 
information that could be disseminated to the members of the department. Alternatively, a 
different participant submitted that the effort should include fire service representatives 
researching, analyzing, and sharing fire service–specific information and serving as 
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subject-matter experts with law enforcement representatives. Another participant advised 
that fire service agencies should have a seat at the table because they understand how 
different scenarios will affect fire service operations. Moreover, a different participant 
supported the assertion by suggesting the need for integrated response planning. Still, 
others suggested that the fire service should be a collector, analyst, disseminator, and 
recipient of intelligence.  
To further support collaborative efforts, several participants suggested differing 
forms of integration. In the survey, 11 participants recommended fire service participation 
in state and local fusion centers and JTTFs. Alternatively, five participants recommended 
that fire service personnel participate as terrorism liaison officers in their respective 
jurisdictions. Additionally, participants suggested that the fire service take on the role of 
subject-matter experts who contribute to the overall homeland security mission. 
Furthermore, participants envisioned a two-way information-sharing system that provides 
real-time intelligence sharing and a common operating picture between pertinent partners. 
b. Consumer 
The participants also offered numerous suggestions for the ideal state of fire service 
intelligence consumption. While most of the responses were general, others suggested 
more specific intelligence needs. The intelligence needs centered on personnel safety, 
operational and situational awareness, preparation, planning, and response. First, several 
participants pointed to the need for intelligence to provide for the safety of response 
personnel. For example, one participant suggested the need for information on credible 
threats or operations that pose a high risk to first responders. Alternatively, a different 
participant proposed the need for intelligence on atypical threats. Moreover, one participant 
advised that fire service agencies need warning intelligence, so firefighters may understand 
how to respond to various incidents. Finally, one participant asserted that the fire service 
should receive intelligence only for personnel safety, suggesting that too much information 
would lead to overload.  
Second, participants believed the fire service needs intelligence for operational and 
situational awareness. For instance, one participant emphasized the need for the fire service 
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to receive intelligence regarding influxes of narcotics, large gatherings, or any threat to 
public safety. On the other hand, another participant suggested a need for information on 
pending natural disasters such as storms and reinforced the need for information on large 
gatherings. Also, participants recounted the need for intelligence regarding target hazards, 
high-profile visitors, festivals, and high-risk populations. Furthermore, participants 
maintained that the fire service needs intelligence regarding active violence incidents, 
pandemics, arson, and bomb threats. Finally, one participant recommended receiving 
intelligence on high-risk occupancies, including illegal drug manufacturing facilities, and 
known locations where occupants have a history of threatening first responders.  
Also, participants highlighted a need for intelligence to guide preparations in an all-
hazards environment. In this case, participants suggested that having an understanding of 
particular issues is useful in preparing fire service organizations. Also, nine participants 
suggested that fire service training may benefit from the receipt of intelligence. 
Furthermore, one participant advised of the intelligence need for ongoing risk-and-needs 
assessments. Likewise, participants emphasized that understanding threats allow fire 
departments to match threats with known capabilities and to acquire new capabilities. 
For planning purposes, fire service participants believe there is a need for the fire 
service to work jointly with law enforcement to develop operational plans. As such, four 
participants argued that firefighters should work in tandem with law enforcement to 
explore all aspects and impacts when developing plans and to aid in identifying potential 
targets for better community protection. Other participants supported the claim and 
suggested the need for both proactive and reactive planning. Moreover, participants 
advised that the fire service and law enforcement should receive and be privy to the same 
information concurrently. 
Finally, fire service agencies insist on the need to receive all pertinent information 
that may interfere with responses. One particular threat, fire as a weapon, seems to be 
particularly important to fire service agencies. As such, some participants acknowledged 
that fire as a weapon is of paramount concern. Another critical topic involves the receipt 
of real-time, tactical-level information. Five participants identified the need for real-time 
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information for deployment decisions, on-scene decision-making, and variations to 
response routing.  
c. Collector 
Several participants emphasized the need for collecting and sharing information 
with law enforcement and other homeland security–related entities. As such, 23 
participants suggested that there is value in fire service agencies’ documenting and 
reporting information through suspicious activity reporting or other secure communication 
means. Alternatively, some participants argued for sharing fire service–specific 
information, such as inspection information, target hazards, building layouts, risk 
assessments, and hazardous materials. Still, other participants believe the fire service 
should offer direct support to law enforcement in intelligence gathering. For example, one 
participant argued for using fire service aerial ladders and drones for local imaging. 
Similarly, another participant supported providing the intelligence community with 
information on fire service capabilities, so it might assess how to utilize fire agencies 
during incidents.  
Alternatively, some participants insisted that the fire service should limit its 
interaction within the intelligence enterprise to an advisory role. A few others were unsure 
about where the fire service fits into the intelligence apparatus. For example, one 
participant suggested that the uncertainty might be the result of a lack of fire service 
inclusion in intelligence activities. Finally, another participant suggested that the fire 
service does not have any formal role in intelligence.  
2. What are some fire department concerns about receiving intelligence? 
Survey participants offered 17 different concerns for the fire service regarding the 
receipt of intelligence. Approximately 44 percent of participants suggested that security 
and handling of intelligence are of paramount concern. Another 25 percent reported that 
the intelligence they receive lacks timeliness and credibility. Additionally, 17.5 percent of 
participants claimed they do not receive intelligence, or they receive it sporadically. 
Moreover, 8 percent of participants asserted that the fire service lacks analytical abilities 
and an understanding of how to use finished intelligence. 
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Furthermore, participants expressed concerns about receiving too much 
intelligence. To a minor extent, participants seem concerned over legal issues such as 
liability against the department, protection of civil liberties, and the questionable statutory 
authority to engage in intelligence activities. Also, participants expressed concerns about 
mission overlap and a lack of coordination with law enforcement agencies. Finally, three 
participants emphasized that engaging in intelligence activities might affect the public 
perception of firefighters.  
3. What type of interaction does the department have with state or local 
fusion centers? 
According to the survey, fire service interaction with state and local fusion centers 
varies greatly. Of the participants, 34.6 percent claimed they have little to no interactions 
with state and local fusion centers. However, 31.7 percent of participants suggested they 
have close relationships with state and local fusion centers. Moreover, 25 percent of the 
participants stressed they have no formal interaction with fusion centers. Still, others 
advised that they interact with fusion centers through terrorism liaison officers or on an as-
needed basis. Finally, 7 percent of participants stated they were unsure about their 
departments’ interactions with fusion centers.  
4. Does the organization supplying intelligence understand the fire 
department’s intelligence needs? 
In answering this question, 44.54 percent of the participants answered yes, and 52.1 
percent answered no. The remaining 3.36 percent of participants did not offer a response 
to the question. See Figure 4 for a breakdown of these responses. 
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Figure 4. Perception That the Organization Supplying Intelligence 
Understands Fire Service Needs 
5. What are the department’s preferred ways to receive information/ 
intelligence?  
The results of the question revealed that 75.63 percent of all participants receive 
their intelligence from state and local fusion centers. The percentage suggests that there is 
considerable integration of the fire service within fusion centers. Comparatively, 72.27 
percent of participants receive intelligence from state or local intelligence units. The 
information reveals that fire service agencies leverage partnerships with law enforcement 
to a great extent. Additionally, 61.34 percent of participants use the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) for their intelligence needs. The result suggests that a 
majority of fire service agencies are familiar with the network, and they seek intelligence 
and information on their own. Alternatively, 46.22 percent of participant agencies receive 
their intelligence directly from a JTTF, suggesting that the FBI considers the fire service 
an information-sharing partner. To a lesser extent, 15.97 percent of fire service agencies 
create their intelligence internally. Finally, the remaining 11.76 percent of participants 
selected “other,” with two participants stating their agencies do not receive intelligence. 
The remaining agencies receive their intelligence from the following sources: 
∑ Arson Task Force 
∑ Local jurisdictional briefings 
∑ Illinois Mutual Aid Box Alarm System 
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∑ Other fire departments 
∑ Technical Resources for Incident Prevention and the Bomb and Arson 
Tracking System 
∑ Interagency Fire Intelligence Exchange 
Figure 5 represents the sources of intelligence for fire departments that participated 
in the survey. Because this question allowed participants to select all applicable sources, 
the numbers do not add up to 100 percent. The graph further acknowledges that some 
agencies receive intelligence from multiple sources. 
 
Figure 5. Sources of Intelligence for Survey Participants 
6. Is received intelligence of value to the department? 
Although 52.1 percent of participants believe that the organizations providing 
intelligence do not understand fire service intelligence needs, 88.24 percent suggested that 
the intelligence they receive is of value. In contrast, 8.4 percent of participants believe the 
intelligence they receive offers little value to their agencies. An additional 3.36 percent of 
participants declined to provide an answer to the question but were included to ensure the 
pie chart represented 100 percent of respondents.  
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Figure 6. Percentage That Believe Received Intelligence Is of Value 
7. How is intelligence disseminated to the rank and file? 
In responding to the question on intelligence dissemination to the rank and file, 
participants offered a medley of answers. Of those surveyed, 35 participant departments 
disseminate intelligence to the rank and file through departmental email. Another 22 
participants acknowledged that their departments spread information during face-to-face 
briefings. Moreover, eight participants maintained that their departments distribute 
intelligence information through the chain of command, departmental distribution systems, 
memoranda, policies, procedures, list serves, and bulletin boards. Other participants 
mentioned sharing intelligence during training, through terrorism liaison officers, and in 
caution notes documented in computer-aided dispatch systems.  
Additionally, the results of the survey reveal that fire service agencies are creating 
internal barriers to intelligence and information sharing. At least 18 participants suggested 
that battalion chiefs and above receive intelligence. In addition, 17 participants emphasized 
that their departments share intelligence only on a need-to-know basis. Finally, 15 
participants stated that their departments do not share intelligence at any level. This author 
argues that departments should disseminate intelligence under a need-to-share concept. 
The distinction is important because fire service agencies already struggle to receive 
intelligence, and employing artificial barriers limits its utility.  
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8. What type of intelligence or information does the department need for 
standing information requirements? 
This question sought to establish the standing information needs of fire service 
agencies. A majority of participants, 62 percent, stated that they need specific threat 
information on known homeland security issues that may affect first responders. 
Additionally, several respondents indicated they need information for situational 
awareness to prevent the loss of life and to inform response decisions. Still, others 
suggested the need for contextual information, so they might understand the entire threat 
picture. Some of the participants identified specific information they need—such as 
information on sovereign citizens; national-level concerns; cyber threats; human 
smuggling; pandemics; threats to critical infrastructure and key resources; threats made via 
social media; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats; theft of first responder 
uniforms, vehicles, and equipment; civil unrest; school threats; and explosives. Finally, 
about 10 percent of respondents were unsure about their departments’ standing information 
needs.  
9. How does the department use information/intelligence to support daily 
operations? 
About 35 percent of respondents stated their departments use 
information/intelligence to maintain situational awareness. Another 21 percent indicated 
that their departments do not currently use information/intelligence to support daily 
operations. Also, 14 percent specified that their departments use intelligence to inform 
operational staffing decisions while another 13 percent use intelligence in their planning 
processes. Additionally, about 8 percent of the participants mentioned they use 
information/intelligence for training purposes. The remaining participants mentioned that 
their departments use information/intelligence to share with other agencies, make 
equipment purchases, identify force protection needs, and make deployment decisions.  
10. What type of intelligence is required for strategic decision-making? 
Approximately 35 percent of respondents mentioned their departments need 
intelligence on credible threats to inform their strategic decision-making. About 29 percent 
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stated their departments need information on terrorist trends. Additionally, 17 percent of 
respondents indicated their departments need any intelligence or threat information that 
may affect their responses or resources. Furthermore, 8 percent of respondents did not 
know what type of intelligence their departments need to guide strategic decision-making. 
The remaining respondents mentioned the need for predictive intelligence, specific targets, 
cyber threats, or intelligence that informs strategic equipment purchases and staffing.  
11. What type of intelligence is required for operational decision-making? 
Regarding the intelligence required for operational decision-making, 38 percent of 
respondents stated their departments need intelligence on credible threats. Additionally, 22 
percent identified that their departments require intelligence on any issues that might 
hamper their responses or operations. Another 17 percent indicated their departments need 
specific details regarding potential target locations or threats. Furthermore, 10 percent do 
not know what type of intelligence their departments need because they do not know what 
intelligence is available to their departments. Finally, the remaining respondents mentioned 
that their departments need intelligence that guides their equipment purchases, staffing, 
data analysis, training, or force protection needs.  
12. What type of intelligence is required for tactical decision-making? 
For tactical decision-making, 60 percent of respondents indicated that their 
departments require intelligence on credible, specific threats. Another 12 percent of 
respondents mentioned needing intelligence on issues that affect their responses. 
Additionally, 12 percent stated they do not know what type of intelligence their 
departments need for tactical-level decision-making. The remaining respondents identified 
the need for intelligence in developing contingency plans and training and ensuring they 
have available resources to manage the threat.  
D. PESTEL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The PESTEL framework analyzes external forces that affect organizations through 
multiple overlapping channels. The external forces include political, economic, 
sociocultural, technological, environmental, and legal categories.  
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1. Political Issues 
Respondents to the survey identified several issues that belong in the political 
realm. First, respondents indicated that fire service agencies should have an equal seat at 
the table regarding information and intelligence sharing. Second, they suggested that 
governments at all levels lack understanding of fire service intelligence needs. In addition, 
they mentioned that fire service integration into fusion centers and the overall intelligence 
community is highly sporadic. Still, others highlighted that political mechanisms prevent 
law enforcement and fusion centers from sharing intelligence information with the fire 
service. The problem persists despite numerous guidance and strategy documents 
suggesting that the fire service may play a pivotal role in the ISE.84 Finally, many 
participants pointed out that their departments rely on ad hoc relationships with local law 
enforcement to obtain their intelligence. However, there is some political acceptance of the 
fire service in the ISE, despite implementation issues. The findings are significant because 
the fire service must have access to timely, relevant information and intelligence to fulfill 
its pivotal role in the homeland security domain. Based on these findings, new strategy 
documents should mandate intelligence and information sharing among all levels of the 
government and between all first response agencies.  
 
84 Department of Homeland Security, Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise: Concept Plan (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, August 2009); Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National 
Network of Fusion Centers; Department of Homeland Security, 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers; 
Department of Justice, “Fire Service Integration”; Homeland Security Advisory Council, “Intelligence and 
Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland Security Intelligence & Information Fusion” (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2005); Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, 
Intelligence Guide for First Responders, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2011), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo12126/ITACG_Guide_for_First_Responders_
2011.pdf; International Association of Fire Chiefs, Intelligence Guide for Fire Chiefs; Joint 
Counterterrorism Assessment Team, JCAT Intelligence Guide for First Responders (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/nctc/jcat/jcat_ctguide/intel_
guide.html; Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 
White House, 2002), ProQuest; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 
9/11 Commission Report; Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for Information Sharing: 
Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2007), 3, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a473664.pdf; Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, Domestic Approach to National Intelligence (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, 2016), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/DomesticApproachto
NationalIntelligence.PDF; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018 Information Sharing 
Environment. 
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2. Economic Issues 
In responding to the survey, the participants highlighted the economic issues their 
departments face regarding information sharing. A significant issue affecting fire service 
agencies is the lack of training and expertise in the uses of intelligence. Additionally, 
participants indicated that they lack funding to purchase the necessary information systems 
to support their information-sharing initiatives. Moreover, some fire service agencies do 
not have funding available to detail personnel to fusion centers or other intelligence 
agencies. Finally, participants emphasized that their agencies lack the funding to pay for 
and obtain security clearances for their personnel. Although this author agrees that fire 
service agencies struggle with funding, there are grant opportunities available to offset 
some of the economic burdens.  
3. Socio-Cultural Issues 
Participants of the survey indicated that several socio-cultural challenges affect fire 
service intelligence processes. First, participants pointed to trust issues among the fire 
service, law enforcement, and the greater intelligence community. More specifically, 
participants stated that the intelligence community often overlooks the fire service because 
it lacks a law enforcement nexus. Additionally, law enforcement agencies worry about 
intelligence leaks that might compromise investigations. Another issue is that the fire 
service believes it might lose community trust if it more closely aligns with law 
enforcement and begins community surveillance activities. Finally, cultural differences 
between the fire service and law enforcement add to the mistrust. Participants suggested 
that the fire service tends to share information more broadly while law enforcement tends 
to share information on a need-to-know basis.  
The cultural differences between fire and law enforcement agencies limit their 
collaboration on other homeland security projects. For example, survey participants 
mentioned a lack of integrated response planning and little collaboration on intelligence 
products. Additionally, participants stated that the lack of collaboration leads to 
inconsistent receipt of intelligence, and the intelligence they do receive lacks relevance to 
the fire service mission. Furthermore, the cultural barriers prevent law enforcement 
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agencies from gaining an awareness of fire service capabilities and limit their use of fire 
personnel as subject-matter experts. Moreover, as intelligence is mostly in the domain of 
law enforcement, the fire service lacks analytic capabilities, and often the exchange of 
information lacks timeliness. What this author takes away from experience with law 
enforcement is that fire service agencies gain trust through greater collaboration. Moreover, 
better collaboration and communication between the two disciplines might eliminate most 
of the cultural barriers to intelligence and information sharing. These findings have 
important implications for the broader domain of homeland security because the fire 
service and law enforcement are among the first to respond to incidents, and their daily 
operations may allow them to identify terrorist plots before they occur.  
4. Technological Issues 
Technology use in the fire service is increasing dramatically. As such, several 
participants highlighted some of the technological issues associated with information 
sharing. First, they highlighted that the fire service and law enforcement do not have a 
shared intelligence platform. Participants stated that not having a shared system limits the 
sharing of real-time information, and the fire service does not have a common operating 
picture with law enforcement. Additionally, participants indicated that their departments 
do not have an easily accessible reporting platform to submit suspicious activity reports. 
Furthermore, participants mentioned that their departments lack secure intelligence 
interfaces and raised concern about protecting sensitive information. Moreover, 
departments that use the HSIN find it cumbersome and the periodic password changes 
frustrating. Finally, participants indicated that their departments are concerned with cyber 
operations. Understanding the technological challenges is important because first response 
agencies rely on speed and accuracy of intelligence to maintain situational awareness while 
responding to incidents.  
5. Environmental Issues 
The current threat environment is dynamic and ever-changing. As such, survey 
participants specified several environmental issues that are of concern to their agencies. A 
primary concern is the use of fire as a weapon, as noted by several participants. 
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Additionally, fire service agencies have raised concern about the shift from international 
to domestic terrorism. Several participants cited right-wing movements, sovereign citizens, 
and homegrown violent extremists as particular areas of concern. As safety is always a 
priority, several participants highlighted emerging threats and attacks on first responders 
as essential environmental topics. Additionally, participants indicated that more nascent 
issues, such as protests, pandemics, natural disasters, and active-shooter incidents, are 
critical topics for consideration.  
6. Legal Issues 
In a litigious society like the United States, legal issues are of paramount concern 
for fire service agencies. Expressly, participants indicated that their agencies have concerns 
with lawsuits against their personnel for engaging in information sharing and suspicious 
activity reporting. An additional legal issue of concern to departments is whether fire 
service agencies have statutory authority to engage in intelligence activities and view law 
enforcement sensitive information. Finally, participants indicated that their agencies have 
concerns regarding privacy and civil liberty protections as they relate to intelligence 
gathering.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the participants in the survey offered useful information, which is not 
found elsewhere, to guide the development of a fire service information-sharing strategy. 
First, fire service agencies believe they should be equal partners in intelligence activities 
and engage in joint planning with their law enforcement counterparts. Second, the survey 
identifies several successful forms of integration for the fire service, eliminating the need 
for a one-size-fits-all approach. However, some agencies still experience difficulty with 
intelligence integration. Additionally, the participants identified a lack of understanding of 
fire service requirements by intelligence-providing agencies. However, an analysis of the 
survey answers reveals that fire service agencies are unclear of their role in establishing 
intelligence requirements and forwarding them to their intelligence provider for tasking. 
Furthermore, participants offered evidence that many in the fire service do not know how 
to use finished intelligence products. Moreover, the survey suggests that fire service 
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agencies lack analytical capabilities and have trouble distinguishing between strategic-, 
operational-, and tactical-level intelligence needs. However, analytical capabilities vary 
between departments. Some agencies have dedicated intelligence officers who provide 
analysis and context. Other agencies rely primarily on analysis and interpretations from 
their intelligence providers. Additionally, participants advised that there are trust issues 
between the fire service and law enforcement, and they fear losing trust within the 
community. Finally, some participants are unclear on their statutory authority to engage in 
intelligence activities. Chapter III explores intelligence policies and practices to identify 
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III. CURRENT FIRE SERVICE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
Chapter II offered a fresh perspective on the intelligence needs and challenges of 
the fire service. The current policies and practices that govern intelligence activities in the 
United States follow logically. A fair assessment of the value and relevance of fire service 
intelligence activities requires understanding what intelligence is, where it comes from, 
and how the fire service uses it. This chapter first provides an overview of intelligence, 
including a working definition, a description of the intelligence cycle, and a description of 
intelligence types, markings, and handling procedures. Next, it provides an overview of the 
intelligence community and how it integrates with the fire service. It then focuses on fire 
service–specific guidelines, policies, and practices. Finally, it concludes with key 
takeaways from the discussion.  
A. INTELLIGENCE OVERVIEW  
1. Intelligence Definition 
There are several definitions of intelligence. According to Mark Lowenthal, 
“Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national 
security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers.”85 Lyman 
Kilpatrick defines intelligence as “the knowledge—and, ideally, foreknowledge—sought 
by nations in response to external threats and to protect their vital interests, especially the 
well-being of their own people.”86 Others define intelligence as the ability to estimate 
changes in time to adjust to the changes.87 Lowenthal’s characterization serves as the 
definition for this thesis. This distinction is significant because an apt definition allows for 
a better understanding of the subject.  
 
85 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 10. 
86 Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence,’” Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 
3. 
87 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 10. 
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2. The Intelligence Cycle 
The intelligence cycle is the process practitioners use to gather information, process 
it, and deliver intelligence products to policymakers.88 The process varies by country and 
has between five and seven steps. Johnson and Wirtz describe five steps in the cycle: 
planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, and 
dissemination.89 Alternatively, Lowenthal identifies seven steps: identifying requirements, 
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination, 
consumption, and feedback.90 The following details Lowenthal’s seven steps: 
1. Identifying Requirements: The process of identifying the policy interests 
and priorities for gathering intelligence.91 
2. Collection: The process of identifying methods and gathering information 
based on the requirements.92 
3. Processing and Exploitation: The steps necessary to transform collected 
information into intelligence.93 
4. Analysis and Production: The process of assigning meaning to intelligence 
and developing intelligence products.94 
5. Dissemination: The process of providing consumers with finished 
intelligence products.95 
6. Consumption: The process of reviewing and using finished intelligence by 
policymakers.96 
 
88 Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology, 
5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 45. 
89 Johnson and Wirtz, 45. 
90 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 73. 
91 Lowenthal, 74. 
92 Lowenthal, 80. 
93 Lowenthal, 81. 
94 Lowenthal, 82–83. 
95 Lowenthal, 84. 
96 Lowenthal, 75. 
39 
7. Feedback: A dialogue between producers and consumers to detail how 
well they met the requirements, make adjustments to finished products, or 
establish updated requirements.97 
The intelligence cycle provides consumers with knowledge for decision-making 
advantage. The distinction is important because many of the survey participants 
acknowledged that they were unsure of what intelligence is available to inform their 
decisions. Ultimately, policy- and decision-makers must provide the agencies that process 
their intelligence with information to establish requirements.  
3. Intelligence Levels and Application 
Three levels of intelligence guide decision-making at the organizational level: 
strategic, operational, and tactical.98 According to the Department of Defense, “The levels 
provide a doctrinal perspective that clarifies the links between strategic objectives, effects, 
and tactical actions and assists commanders in visualizing a logical flow of operations, 
allocating resources, and assigning tasks.”99 Determining whether an action is strategic, 
operational, or tactical depends on how it contributes to achieving the respective goals.100 
a. Strategic Intelligence 
Strategic intelligence looks at long-term issues that may affect how an organization 
plans for the future. Intelligence analysts create strategic intelligence for executive-level 
officials, such as fire chiefs, assistant chiefs, and deputy chiefs in the fire service. 
Accordingly, executive officials use strategic intelligence to develop strategies and 
policies, assist with strategic planning activities, identify trends, and support strategic-level 
operations.101  
 
97 Lowenthal, 75. 
98 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, JP 2-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), I-21–
22. 
99 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-21. 
100 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-21. 
101 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-21. 
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b. Operational Intelligence 
Operational intelligence looks at the information needed for short- to mid-term 
issues that may affect agency operations. Intelligence analysts create operational 
intelligence to serve mid-level officials, such as battalion chiefs, division chiefs, or district 
chiefs in the fire service. As such, mid-level managers use operational intelligence to plan 
operations; monitor events; match capabilities to threats; provide relevant, timely, and 
credible assessments; and monitor natural or human-made disasters.102 
c. Tactical Intelligence 
Tactical intelligence is perishable intelligence that supports current tactical 
operations and keeps personnel out of danger. Intelligence analysts create tactical 
intelligence for line supervisors and incident commanders, such as lieutenants, captains, 
and battalion chiefs. Accordingly, line supervisors and incident commanders use tactical 
intelligence to inform decision-making to achieve tactical objectives. Therefore, tactical 
intelligence must be accurate, relevant, timely, and precise, with detailed information on 
who, what, when, where, and how.103 Additionally, tactical intelligence provides incident 
commanders with information on imminent threats to response personnel.104 
4. Intelligence Types  
The IC gathers intelligence through numerous methods. The first is open-source 
intelligence, which is intelligence gathered from public information sources.105 Next is 
geospatial intelligence, which is information gathered from various imaging methods, such 
as spy planes and satellites.106 Also, there is signals intelligence (SIGINT), which is the 
gathering of information over electronic media, such as telephones and internet 
communications.107 SIGINT also includes communications intelligence, the collection of 
 
102 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, Intelligence Guide, I-22. 
103 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, I-22. 
104 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, I-22. 
105 Johnson and Wirtz, Intelligence, 48. 
106 Johnson and Wirtz, 48–49. 
107 Johnson and Wirtz, 49–50. 
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information from telecommunications such as radio waves.108 Electronic intelligence is 
also a sub-field of SIGINT, which collects radar signatures and electronic fingerprints.109 
Additionally, there is what the military calls measurements and signatures intelligence, 
which captures information from the telemetry emissions of missiles, as well as acoustic 
and seismic information.110 Finally, there is human intelligence, which agents gather from 
espionage activities either directly or through proxies.111 Individually, the sources have 
distinct advantages and disadvantages and provide only pieces of a larger puzzle; however, 
such a broad discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. To leverage the advantages and 
limit the disadvantages, the IC engages in all-source fusion processes to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of adversaries.112 Understanding the various methods 
available gives policymakers greater insight into how they might frame their intelligence 
requirements.  
5. Intelligence Markings and Handling Requirements 
Fire service personnel must be aware of intelligence classifications and handling 
requirements if they gain access to and use such information. The sensitive nature of 
intelligence necessitates specific markings and handling. The overarching types of 
intelligence and information are classified national security information (CNSI) and 
controlled unclassified information (CUI).113 Ultimately, understanding the unique 
markings and handling requirements allows fire service agencies to understand how to 
disseminate and protect such information from public view. 
Fire service personnel with security clearances may be entrusted with receiving 
CNSI material. The most sensitive national security information is subject to CNSI 
 
108 “INTelligence: Signals Intelligence,” Central Intelligence Agency, last updated April 30, 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/intelligence-
signals-intelligence-1.html. 
109 Central Intelligence Agency. 
110 Johnson and Wirtz, Intelligence, 50. 
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113 Center for Development of Security Excellence, Marking Classified Information Job Aid 
(Linthicum, MD: Defense Security Service, 2017), 31. 
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classification procedures. According to DHS, “Classified information is information that 
has been determined by a delegated official within the Executive Branch of the Federal 
Government to require protection because its release or disclosure could cause damage to 
the national security.”114 Additionally, the organization responsible for the intelligence 
identifies it by one of three classification levels. The classification levels are top secret, 
secret, and confidential, and each has differing criteria for such classification. Top secret 
information is any information with which unauthorized disclosure may cause 
“exceptionally grave damage to the national security.”115 Alternatively, the system 
identifies secret information as that which may cause serious damage to national security 
if an agency releases it without authorization.116 Finally, the system identifies confidential 
information as that which may cause damage to national security.117 The takeaway from 
this section is that fire service personnel who attain security clearances must understand 
how to safeguard and store sensitive national security information. 
Alternatively, most fire service personnel may be privy to CUI information, through 
various means, with a need to know in carrying out their roles and responsibilities. CUI 
information includes For Official Use Only and Law Enforcement Sensitive subsets. 
Accordingly, the Defense Security Service defines CUI “as unclassified information that 
requires safeguarding or dissemination controls, pursuant to and consistent with applicable 
law, regulations, and Government-wide policies.”118 A critical distinction between CNSI 
and CUI is that a security clearance is unnecessary to receive CUI information, but a person 
must pass a background examination.119 Additionally, agencies cannot combine CNSI 
markings with other classifiers, while CUI information commonly uses additional terms. 
This terminology includes identifiers such as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Law 
 
114 Department of Homeland Security, Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive but Unclassified 
Information: Reference Booklet for State, Local, Tribal and Private Sector Programs (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2005), 6, https://homeport.uscg.mil/Lists/Content/Attachments/2110/
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115 Department of Homeland Security, 6. 
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Enforcement Sensitive (LES), Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and Sensitive 
Security Information (SSI).120 Ultimately, fire service agencies and personnel must know 
how to handle and store CUI information to protect it from unauthorized disclosure.  
a. FOUO: For Official Use Only 
FOUO is a dissemination control marking, but not a classification.121 As such, 
agencies may share FOUO information with other governmental agencies and, to some 
extent, the private sector.122 Additionally, FOUO information must have markings to 
inform the end-user of its sensitive nature and appropriate handling requirements.123 The 
marking identifies information that users cannot release to the public without the 
permission of the originating agency.124 Additionally, the markers may reference the 
originating agency, an expiration date, and instructions on how to downgrade the 
information.125 Finally, the IC restricts FOUO information to persons with a documented 
need to know, and the information must be necessary to perform official duties.126 The 
restrictions differ from CNSI information, which requires that the requestor have a security 
clearance at or above the classification level.  
b. LES: Law Enforcement Sensitive 
At times, fire service agencies may have access to LES information, which may 
originate from law enforcement agencies at any level of government. Accordingly, the 
information may contain sensitive information about ongoing investigations or reveal 
sources and methods, among other operational law enforcement information.127 A majority 
of LES documents are available on the HSIN, and vetted fire service members have access 
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to the products. Therefore, persons accessing LES information may not disseminate it 
without permission from the originating agency.128 In the end, fire service agencies must 
ensure they follow LES handling requirements to maintain trust and access to intelligence 
developed by law enforcement agencies.  
c. PII: Personally Identifiable Information 
Fire service agencies have access to PII as part of their reporting processes through 
the National Fire Incident Reporting System or health records they generate on emergency 
medical runs. PII is any information that alone may reveal a person’s identity or when used 
with other personal information may identify an individual.129 To protect the identity of an 
individual, PII requires a risk assessment on an individual basis.130 The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act and the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health Act spell out most PII requirements for fire departments that access 
such information. Thus, fire service agencies are already aware of such handling 
requirements and protections. 
d. SSI: Sensitive Security Information 
As part of their coordination with transit agencies and other critical infrastructure, 
fire service agencies may gain access to SSI. Federal law governs SSI as it contains 
sensitive but unclassified information that may be harmful to transportation security.131 As 
such, the federal government may impose enforcement actions or civil penalties on 
agencies who disclose such information without authorization.132 SSI is subject to the 
handling requirements outlined in 49 C.F.R. § 1520.133 The regulation states, “No part of 
this record may be disclosed to persons without a ‘need to know,’ as defined in 49 CFR 
parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the 
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Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation.”134 
Accordingly, fire service agencies must protect SSI, or they may face severe government 
sanctions. 
B. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
In the United States, the IC is a loose federation of 17 agencies. Each of the agencies 
has a separate mission for gathering national intelligence, which includes domestic, 
foreign, and homeland security intelligence.135 According to Lowenthal, “The community 
is made up of agencies and offices whose work is often related and sometimes combined, 
but they serve different needs or different policy makers.”136 Consequently, management 
and execution represent the two functional areas of the IC.137 The management aspect 
refers to establishing requirements, gathering resources, establishing a collection plan, and 
determining production products.138 Alternatively, execution refers to developing systems 
for collection, collecting and producing intelligence, and maintaining intelligence 
infrastructure.139 Ultimately, the fire service needs to understand the makeup of the IC, so 
it is better informed regarding how the IC produces and disseminates intelligence. For a 
depiction of the IC, see Figure 7. 
 
134 Protection of Sensitive Security Information, 49 C.F.R. § 1520.13 (2004), https://www.law.
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139 Lowenthal, 44. 
46 
 
Figure 7. Agencies of the Intelligence Community140 
Policymakers at all levels of government need intelligence and information to 
inform their homeland security policy development. According to the ISE annual report, 
“The U.S. Government’s ability to effectively share terrorism-related information and 
other information related to multiple threat actors, as well as their networks, and then use 
that information to support a broad array of national security–related missions and 
activities is essential in protecting the homeland.”141 As such, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence proposes that federal, state, and local partners are essential in meeting 
homeland security mission objectives.142 Accordingly, state, local, tribal, and territorial 
agencies primarily receive information from DHS and the FBI.143 Additionally, the 2007 
 
140 Source: “What We Do,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed April 17, 2020, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do. 
141 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018 Information Sharing Environment, 19. 
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National Strategy for Information Sharing suggests that sharing information should be the 
rule, not the exception, and federal, state, local, and tribal governments may use such 
information for budgeting, developing resilience plans, preventing terrorism, developing 
training plans, and prioritizing response and recovery efforts.144 Because terrorism and 
other disasters are local events, and local agencies are first on the scene and the last 
personnel to leave, information sharing is paramount.145 Ultimately, to better inform fire 
service strategies, operations, and tactics, the fire service needs access to timely and 
relevant intelligence.  
Notwithstanding, the fragmented nature and the redundant mechanisms of the IC 
emphasize several problems, which have been the subjects of government reports. The 9/11 
Commission Report pushed for the reorganization of the IC and the development of the ISE 
to prevent surprise attacks by aligning all IC agencies. The 9/11 Commission offered 
several recommendations, including unifying strategic intelligence and operational 
planning under a National Counterterrorism Center, coalescing the IC under a national 
intelligence director, and developing a network-based information-sharing system.146 The 
IC applied these recommendations as activities under the IRTPA of 2004.147 However, as 
Amy Zegart points out, the IC remains disjointed despite the IRTPA and the creation of a 
director of national intelligence.148 Additionally, the Domestic Approach suggests that 
absent unity of effort, unreliable practices, and the lack of doctrine still typify the domestic 
intelligence environment.149 Other challenges include the FBI and DHS counterterrorism 
mission overlap, large geographic regions, a lack of clear vision, and a focus on 
sustainment over enhancement.150 This issue is important because the fire service, along 
with many other agencies, relies on the IC for its intelligence needs. Therefore, 
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understanding the insular issues arms the fire service with the information it needs to take 
steps to resolve problems early in the intelligence integration process. 
Ultimately, the obstacles faced at federal, state, and local levels produce significant 
challenges for fire service agencies. First, there is the issue of finding linkages to the overall 
IC, considering the involvement of numerous agencies. Second, there is the challenge for 
the fire service in receiving relevant and timely information to inform strategic, 
operational, and tactical decision-making. Additionally, the documents lack detailed 
guidance on how fire service agencies may use intelligence to inform decision-making. 
Finally, the fire service must find ways to counter parochialism to ensure it receives a 
steady flow of intelligence to protect its communities.  
C. FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE CONCEPT PLAN 
To reduce the challenges associated with establishing fire service intelligence 
requirements and usage, in 2009, DHS developed the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise 
(FSIE)’s Concept Plan. The FSIE was one of the earliest efforts undertaken to integrate 
the fire service into the greater intelligence community, under the assumption that the fire 
service would provide a value-added capacity in DHS efforts to prevent, protect, respond 
to, and recover from terrorist activities.151 To guide the development process, DHS and 
other partners ensured the activities aligned with relevant federal policies, directives, 
strategies, and legislation. See Table 1 for a list of relevant policies. 
  
 
151 Department of Homeland Security, Concept Plan, 4. 
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Table 1. List of FSIE-Related Directives, Policies, Strategies, and Legislation 
Year Policy, Directive, Strategy, or Law Organization 
2002 Homeland Security Act of 2002 Public Law 107–296 
2003 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan Department of Justice 
2004 
Executive Order 13356: “Strengthening the 
Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect 
Americans” 
White House 
2004  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 Public Law 108–458 
2005 Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture 
Bureau of Justice 
Assistance 
2005 
Executive Order 13388: “Further Strengthening 




Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies: “Guidelines and 
Requirements in Support of the Information 
Sharing Environment” 
White House 
2006 Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan 
Information Sharing 
Environment 
2006 Fusion Center Guidelines 
Department of Justice; 
Department of Homeland 
Security 
2007 Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 Public Law 110–53 
2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security White House 
2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing White House 
2008 DHS Information Sharing Strategy Department of Homeland Security 
2008 Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise 
Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence 
2008 Executive Order 12333: “United States Intelligence Activities” (as amended) White House 
2008 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers Department of Justice 
2008 DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan Department of Homeland Security 
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The FSIE’s Concept Plan establishes the legal basis for domestic information and 
intelligence collection and sharing. Additionally, the plan recognizes that the fire service 
plays an integral role in every homeland security mission. Accordingly, the plan identifies 
agencies from which the fire service may receive intelligence and mechanisms by which 
to satisfy fire service intelligence needs. Finally, the most significant outcome of the FSIE 
initiative is a set of guidelines for integrating the fire service into state and local fusion 
centers. Integration into fusion centers is vital to the fire service because they enable a two-
way flow of intelligence, and fusion centers act as a hub for intelligence that comes from 
the IC.  
Unfortunately, the FSIE Concept Plan no longer exists in its original form. Robert 
Covert has suggested that the FSIE plan dissolved in 2010.152 However, most of the tenets 
set out in the FSIE Concept Plan have been placed in the “Fire Service Integration for 
Fusion Centers” appendix, which appears in the next section of this chapter. Additionally, 
interested individuals have taken on remnants of the program. Currently, DHS maintains a 
fire service intelligence liaison position that maintains the HSIN’s emergency services site, 
with sub-linkages to fire service intelligence. There are more than 27,000 members of the 
fire service vetted for site access. Additionally, as Keith Henke details, 
The FSIE is a management initiative between the Department of Homeland 
Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Fire Administration, and was 
created to provide organized Federal support incorporation [for] the Fire 
Service in gathering, analyzing, and disseminating homeland security 
related information and intelligence. The goals of the FSIE initiative include 
supporting fire service collaboration within state and major urban area 
fusion centers and facilitating the identification and development of 
information and intelligence sharing requirements, mechanisms, technical 
assistance, and training for fire service personnel.153 
 
152 Robert M. Covert II, “Evolving the Local Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise in New York State: 
Implementing a Threat Liaison Officer Program” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 34, 
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The observation that there is still a great deal of interest in the fire service 
intelligence process—given that there are 27,000 members—is important because it shows 
how the fire service views intelligence as an integral part of its planning and operations.  
D. FIRE SERVICE INTEGRATION FOR FUSION CENTERS 
In 2010, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a guide titled “Fire Service 
Integration for Fusion Centers” as an appendix to Baseline Capabilities for State and Major 
Urban Area Fusion Centers. The guide recognizes the fire service as a valuable partner in 
the overall intelligence enterprise. Accordingly, the DOJ states, “The integration of fire 
service organizations and personnel into the fusion process enhances the efforts of all 
homeland security partners across all mission areas.”154 The guide further acknowledges 
that the fire service may serve as a consumer, collaborator, or contributor vis-à-vis fusion 
centers.155 The guide is important to the fire service because it highlights various ways it 
may integrate into the IC through fusion centers. 
Beyond confirming the value-added benefits of integrating fire services, the guide 
highlights the critical elements necessary to inform fire service intelligence usage. More 
specifically, the guide aids the fire service in developing intelligence requirements, 
reporting suspicious activity, conducting risk assessments, outlining procedures to receive 
alerts and warnings, and maintaining situational awareness.156 Additionally, the guide 
helps fire service agencies develop feedback mechanisms to ensure received intelligence 
is of value. 
E. INTELLIGENCE GUIDE FOR FIRE CHIEFS 
Sensing the need for fire service intelligence practices, the IAFC provided the 
necessary leadership. Accordingly, the IAFC developed the Intelligence Guide for Fire 
Chiefs to serve as a reference for collaboration with DHS.157 The IAFC developed the guide 
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because fire service agencies have struggled to obtain relevant intelligence information. 
The intelligence guide highlights various resources available to the fire service for its 
intelligence needs. More specifically, the guide suggests developing partnerships with 
fusion centers, JTTFs, and local law enforcement agencies.158 Additionally, the guide 
recommends engaging in information-sharing portals such as the HSIN, Law Enforcement 
Online, Technical Resources for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire), and the National 
Terrorism Advisory System.159 The guide has important implications for the broader 
domain of information sharing as the fire service has realized it must lead the effort for 
improved information-sharing practices. 
Subsequently, the IAFC realized that the fire service has unique capabilities that 
are beneficial to the IC. To add value to the IC, the guide recommends involvement in 
reporting activities. For such reporting, the guide suggests submitting suspicious activity 
reports (SARs), involving line-level personnel in the Nationwide SAR Initiative, and 
promoting the “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign.160 Furthermore, the 
guide advises identifying personnel to apply for security clearances to gain access to more 
privileged intelligence information.161 Finally, the guide proposes developing a 
dissemination process to distribute intelligence to other members of the agency. The report 
recommends developing an intelligence liaison officer program with state and local fusion 
centers to accomplish dissemination goals.162 Ultimately, the IAFC has recognized that the 
fire service might serve as a contributor and collaborator—instead of relegating itself to 
consumer. 
F. INTELLIGENCE GUIDE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS 
Local responders working on the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) 
at the National Counterterrorism Center acknowledged a need for more comprehensive 
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information sharing among response personnel. The JCAT developed the Intelligence 
Guide for First Responders to increase information sharing among all levels of 
government.163 The guide provides a high-level overview of how to gain access to 
information, understand estimative language, and report suspicious activity, among other 
things.164 The addition of the guide gave first responders insight into intelligence processes 
and the intelligence community.  
1. Gaining Access to Sensitive Information 
Agencies performing homeland security or law enforcement–related duties may 
access unclassified information through several online portals.165 The portals include 
previously mentioned sites such as the HSIN, Law Enforcement Online, and TRIPwire. 
Likewise, agencies may access information through the National Situation Awareness 
Room (SitAware), Intelink-U, the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal, and the Regional 
Information Sharing Systems Network, all of which have different vetting practices.166 
2. Estimative Language 
The IC uses estimative language to judge the likelihood or probability of an 
event.167 Typically, there are three degrees of likelihood: high confidence, moderate 
confidence, and low confidence. High confidence is a solid judgment based on high-quality 
information.168 Alternatively, moderate confidence indicates the information is not 
corroborated but credible.169 Finally, low confidence indicates that there may be concerns 
with the sources, making it difficult to arrive at firm conclusions.170 The high, moderate, 
and low confidence judgments identify the scope and quality of the intelligence 
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provided.171 Understanding estimative language is essential for the fire service because it 
helps personnel grasp the likelihood of an incident occurring.  
3. Suspicious Activity Reporting  
During the ordinary course of business, firefighters can identify suspicious 
behaviors in their communities. In some instances, reported suspicious activities have led 
to arrests, corroborated intelligence, or disrupted terrorist attacks.172 Consequently, 
firefighters should engage in SAR activities. To enable firefighters to submit SARs, DHS 
and the FBI developed the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative.173 This 
program promotes reporting observations for vetting and sharing of information. 
Additionally, the program offers online training to highlight the SAR process and ensure 
that firefighters protect the civil liberties of ordinary citizens. The JCAT guide offers 10 
ways for firefighters to incorporate SARs into agency operations.  
G. CONCLUSION 
After the events of 9/11, DHS and the FBI created several guidance documents that 
govern domestic intelligence processes and programs. Although the current policies 
identify mechanisms for the fire service to consume, collect, and collaborate in intelligence 
processes, they all have fallen short. First, the processes fail to establish the requirements 
necessary for intelligence agencies to understand fire service intelligence needs. Second, 
the processes do not elaborate on how a fire chief or fire service agency may use 
intelligence to inform strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making. Ultimately, a 
gap persists between policy and practice regarding fire service access and the use of 
intelligence products.  
To ensure the fire service has access to the intelligence it needs, fire service 
agencies and leaders have developed policies and practices aimed at collecting, analyzing, 
and disseminating intelligence to support their decision-making. Unfortunately, most in the 
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fire service do not recognize or benefit from the use of the publications. The next chapter 
analyzes the intelligence products for three different fire service agencies. The purpose of 
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IV. CASE STUDIES OF EFFECTIVE FIRE INTELLIGENCE USE, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 
After the initial FSIE program, several fire departments developed their own 
intelligence programs. These include the Chicago Fire Department’s Tactical Operations 
Intelligence Center, the FDNY, and the National Capital Region Threat Intelligence 
Consortium, staffed by the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services 
Department (DCFEMS) and other local agencies. This chapter uses case studies to evaluate 
the specific fire service intelligence products the agencies produce. The case studies 
evaluate how well agency product lines meet the criteria for intelligence at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels.  
For additional analysis, this chapter uses Lowenthal’s framework for identifying 
good intelligence. The framework analyzes intelligence products on whether they are 
timely, tailored, digestible, and clear regarding knowns and unknowns.174 As Lowenthal 
suggests, “Getting the intelligence to the policymaker on time is more important than 
waiting for every last shred of collection.”175 Under the tailored criterion, Lowenthal 
recognizes the importance of focusing on specific needs while remaining objective.176 The 
digestible aspect advises that the length must allow for a decision-maker to identify the 
most important aspects of the intelligence quickly.177 Finally, clear intelligence identifies 
a degree of confidence regarding knowns and unknowns, and what insight comes from the 
analysis.178 Ultimately, understanding finished intelligence products and what constitutes 
good intelligence may inform other fire service agencies in how to develop and consume 
intelligence products to serve their planning and decision-making needs.  
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A. CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT TOIC 
1. Structure 
Recognizing a need to provide critical information to response personnel, the 
Chicago Fire Department established the Tactical Operations Intelligence Center (TOIC) 
in 2006.179 TOIC develops a bulletin to support internal departmental briefings on 
significant local, national, and international events.180 TOIC publishes the bulletin weekly 
as a sensitive but unclassified document for internal use only, and it averages 12 pages in 
length. Also, the bulletin aggregates information from various fusion center and DHS 
publications. Furthermore, TOIC structures the bulletins into four sections, which include 
significant incidents, national and international intelligence, special events, and significant 
dates.181 Moreover, TOIC supports the information with photos and attributes the sources 
with uniform resource locators. Finally, the Chicago Fire Department coordinates 
intelligence production and dissemination with the Chicago Police Department’s Crime 
Prevention and Information Center (CPIC).182 Its collaboration with CPIC gives Chicago 
Fire access to the Chicago Police Department’s district intelligence bulletins (DIBs), bus 
and rail update reports, intelligence notes, and suspicious activity report intelligence 
analysis. The most useful product for the fire service is the DIBs, intranet-based products 
available from onboard computers that identify problem areas within response districts.183 
Additionally, the system provides real-time intelligence products that are customizable for 
each district.184 
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2. Strategic-Level Intelligence 
For the strategic level, TOIC’s bulletin offers articles from national and 
international sources. A brief analysis of five TOIC bulletins reveals several strategic-level 
considerations. At the national level, the bulletin covers a broad spectrum of potential 
homeland security issues, such as vaccinations, new diseases, inclement weather 
conditions, violence against first responders, and U.S. travel advisories for foreign 
countries. The articles are all open-source summaries, and TOIC does not offer a 
perspective on the strategic implications for fire service agencies. At the international level, 
the bulletin details wide-ranging international security issues that might eventually have a 
domestic nexus. The international topics include information on terrorist tactics, such as 
the use of explosives. Additionally, the bulletin details information on critical infrastructure 
problems abroad and documents the movements and rhetoric of foreign terrorist 
organizations. Moreover, the articles discuss natural disasters in foreign countries.  
Although the articles touch on broad homeland security topics, a user would need 
some analytical skills to determine potential long-term impacts for the department. 
Consequently, fire departments that use such information must train other personnel to 
analyze the articles to make the information more relevant because TOIC does not provide 
the necessary analysis and assessment. Furthermore, the information appears to be little 
more than the news civilians read or aggregate online. TOIC’s bulletin is not very helpful 
for strategic planning and preparation as it fails to offer analysis on the subjects of the 
articles.  
3. Operational-Level Intelligence 
The information in TOIC’s bulletins offers several opportunities to support 
operational intelligence activities. Unfortunately, TOIC does not provide analysis of the 
articles in the bulletins, which is a necessary component for an intelligence product. 
Therefore, a user of the intelligence product must read the articles intently to identify 
specific issues that might affect the organization. Nevertheless, a brief analysis of five such 
bulletins highlights several operational-level considerations. First, the bulletin routinely 
offers information regarding attacks on first responders. Understanding the tactics, 
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techniques, and procedures used by attackers allows for first response agencies to make 
operational adjustments to counter the issues. Second, TOIC’s bulletin highlights incidents 
where adversaries have used fire as a weapon, which may challenge standard response 
models and on-scene operations. Additionally, the bulletin offers information on attacks 
where terrorists have used improvised explosive devices. Finally, the bulletin aggregates 
stories concerning terrorist ideology, terrorism funding, actual targets of terrorist attacks, 
public health issues, and homegrown violent extremism. The information in the articles, 
however, fails to rise to the level of intelligence without additional exploitation and 
processing. TOIC provides no analytical input, leaving the information up to broad 
interpretation.  
4. Tactical-Level Intelligence  
The tactical-level information in TOIC’s bulletin highlights upcoming special 
events and necessary situational awareness. The product employs sub-labels, such as 
assembly, rally, parade, or protest, and details the dates, times, locations, and descriptions 
of the actual events. Unfortunately, the information does not provide additional tactical-
level insight, such as the number of participants, or any known information regarding 
protest groups. However, the information is valuable for situational awareness of 
companies that may respond to the area. Because TOIC does not perform analysis, the 
information lacks substance and does not provide any tactical-level decision-making 
advantage. The information on special events and situational awareness, absent analysis, is 
not intelligence and has limited utility for informing tactics.  
However, DIBs may be of great value at the tactical level because they provide 
real-time intelligence directly to personnel operating in the field. CPIC permitted the 
Chicago Fire Department’s access to DIBs after a shooting incident involving a 
firefighter.185 DIBs provide alerts regarding numerous problems, including gang activity, 
illicit drug sales, shots fired in an area, a most-wanted list, and other intelligence as it 
becomes available.186 Ultimately, access to DIBs provides Chicago fire personnel with 
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real-time information within their response areas, improving personnel safety and 
situational awareness.187  
5. Analytical Value 
TOIC’s bulletin is a compilation of news stories that may have a nexus to terrorism 
or the fire service in general. The news stories provide only general information that does 
not rise to the level of intelligence. Additionally, TOIC does not perform analysis on the 
implications of the information in the articles to inform strategic, operational, and tactical 
decision-making and planning. The lack of analysis leaves the information open to broad, 
independent interpretations, which may pose challenges for response personnel when 
developing plans. The lack of analysis severely limits the utility of TOIC’s bulletin, 
regardless of the subject of the articles. 
6. Lowenthal’s Intelligence Framework 
In using Lowenthal’s framework, the two primary products offer differing 
intelligence value. TOIC develops the bulletin weekly, which is timely for strategic and 
operational levels, but less timely for tactical decision-making. However, TOIC tailors the 
bulletin for internal distribution, so it meets the second criteria under Lowenthal’s frame. 
On the other hand, TOIC’s bulletin is not digestible because the length is generally 12 
pages. Finally, the product is unclear regarding knowns and unknowns because the authors 
do not provide independent analysis.  
Alternatively, CPIC’s DIBs are real-time products, with personnel having access to 
the information through onboard computers. The real-time aspect and ease of access allow 
DIBs to meet the timely metric under Lowenthal’s framework. Although the product is 
timely, CPIC writes the information for district law enforcement personnel, which lacks 
tailoring for the fire service. However, the information in the DIBs is digestible, as it 
encompasses no more than two pages. Finally, DIBs are clear regarding knowns but may 
lack the clarity necessary to provide information on unknowns.  
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B. FDNY INTELLIGENCE  
1. Structure 
The FDNY produces three intelligence publications to support its strategic, 
operational, and tactical decision-making. The publications are Watchline, Fireguard, and 
the FDNY’s Monograph Series. Watchline is a weekly intelligence product that was born 
in the early days of homeland security intelligence processes because law enforcement and 
the intelligence community did not believe the fire service had a place in the intelligence 
discipline. The FDNY still manages its intelligence process despite the move to more fire 
service integration into the intelligence community. 
The structure of Watchline has several significant characteristics that make it highly 
readable while maintaining its importance to fire service personnel. First, the FDNY’s 
Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP) keeps the periodical to one page, 
so a user may browse through and glean all the critical information in a few minutes.188 
Keeping the information brief is essential, especially at the operational and tactical levels. 
Second, the publication is easy to read, with the first sentence of each story capturing the 
essence of the issue at hand.189 Additionally, it provides analysis for each story, so the 
reader gains an understanding of how the issue may affect operations.190 Also, the 
information is timely, reliable, and relevant to emergency services as the product has 
readership outside the fire service.191 The current readership extends to over 150 agencies 
in the United States and 20 countries abroad, equating to over 100,000 consumers.192 
Watchline has influenced several other fire service intelligence products, with most 
providing some form of analysis to add relevancy to the selected news stories. Notably, the 
CTDP develops Watchline using the intelligence cycle, including intelligence 
requirements, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Finally, Watchline 
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touches on several homeland security issues, including terrorism-related tactics, techniques 
and procedures, historical events, first responder–specific concerns, and advances in 
science.193 
The FDNY’s Fireguard is a PowerPoint presentation series that provides an 
expansive overview of a particular topic.194 The CTDP creates Fireguard for internal 
dissemination to field-level units, but the reports are relevant for broader audiences such 
as law enforcement and public health entities.195 Since it’s the presentation’s inception, the 
CTDP has expanded the offerings of Fireguard to include information that is relevant to a 
broader audience than the fire service.196 An examination of two Fireguard products 
reveals that the structure includes background information on the issue; the availability of 
the product; the number of attacks; case studies of relevant incidents, including motivations 
for such attacks; and response considerations. The product provides a great deal of 
information on specific tactics, which may inform strategic, operational, and tactical 
decision-making.  
The Monograph Series is another extension of the intelligence products offered by 
the FDNY’s CDTP. As a monograph studies a topic in great detail, the purpose of this 
intelligence product is solely to provide updates on emergent or critical events to the first 
responder community.197 However, the design and tone of the Monograph Series may 
allow for broader distribution beyond department members. While the product lacks the 
strict standard of writing seen in Watchline in favor of paraphrasing topics and does not 
adhere to a designated length, the CTDP uses it to push out the latest information on a 
subject.198 Although the product is new, it provides significant information regarding the 
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subject area, and the information may find utility at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels.  
2. Strategic-Level Intelligence 
At the strategic level, all three FDNY intelligence products offer tremendous utility. 
First, Watchline identifies terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures that may eventually 
make their way to the United States. An analysis of several Watchline products reveals 
information on numerous foreign and domestic attack trends. Alternatively, the FDNY’s 
Fireguard offers information on both the domestic and international fronts. Domestically, 
Fireguard highlights issues that may pose a danger to first responders or the community. 
Internationally, Fireguard details information on international incidents that may have 
national relevance. Finally, the Monograph Series provides a detailed study of specific 
topics. As the publication is new, it has covered only a few incidents. However, the content 
offers an extensive look at the pandemic and its implications. The three products offer 
executive-level personnel remarkable insight into various trends, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures. The insight may inform policy formulation, planning for equipment and supply 
acquisitions, and development of procedures to counter such issues.  
3. Operational-Level Intelligence 
At the operational level, Watchline and Fireguard offer the most value for mid-
level management. Regarding Watchline the assessment section of each article lends 
insight to inform operational decision-making. For instance, the assessment may detail 
necessary training, communication plans, standard operating guidelines, pre-incident 
planning, personnel safety, and operational coordination. Alternatively, Fireguard offers 
much more in-depth information on specific threats. Accordingly, the products describe 
the specific issue in great detail while following up with implications for operational 
decision-making to ensure effective outcomes. Additionally, Fireguard highlights case 
studies of similar occurrences domestically and internationally. The high level of detail in 
Fireguard allows operational commanders to weigh several considerations before deciding 
on a particular action plan.  
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4. Tactical-Level Intelligence  
At the tactical level, Watchline and Fireguard hold the most promise. The 
assessment section of Watchline identifies numerous tactical considerations related to the 
article. According to Brian Heirston, “Watchline is unique from a fire service perspective 
because the recommendations are tactically oriented, directed to the frontline firefighter, 
concise, and practical.”199 On the other hand, Fireguard offers more detailed response 
considerations to guide tactical decision-making. Watchline and Fireguard support on-
scene tactical decision-making by company commanders and other field response 
personnel. However, Fireguard offers more comprehensive information for informed 
decisions.  
5. Analytical Value 
Regarding analytical value, Watchline and Fireguard offer considerable insight. 
The assessment section of Watchline succinctly describes the critical issues involved in the 
article. The section is usually no more than three sentences and contains crucial 
considerations for strategic, operational, and tactical decisions. Alternatively, Fireguard 
offers more detailed information, but the authors scatter the information throughout the 
presentation. Although Fireguard is more informative, it is less practical than Watchline. 
The Monograph Series, in contrast, offers no analysis and leaves the sense-making up to 
individual readers. Overall, Watchline and Fireguard are excellent sources of analytical 
sense-making for personnel at all levels of the organization.  
6. Lowenthal’s Intelligence Framework 
In using Lowenthal’s framework, the three primary products for the FDNY offer 
different values of intelligence. The FDNY develops the Watchline bulletin weekly, which 
is timely for strategic and operational levels, but much less timely for tactical decision-
making. However, the FDNY tailors the bulletin for internal distribution and limits the 
document to a single page. Therefore, Watchline meets Lowenthal’s criteria for tailoring 
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and digestibility. Additionally, Watchline meets Lowenthal’s concept of clarity as the 
FDNY provides an analysis of knowns and unknowns at the end of each story.  
Alternatively, the FDNY creates Fireguard and the monographs on an as-needed 
basis. The nature of these products may hold strategic and operational intelligence value, 
as they provide information in greater detail. However, they are less timely for the tactical 
level, and the information they provide typically comes from past encounters and incidents. 
The FDNY’s Fireguard and Monograph Series meet Lowenthal’s tailored criterion 
because the FDNY creates the publications for internal dissemination. Although the 
products meet the tailored requirement, they lack digestibility because of their length and 
added detail. Finally, the two publications meet the clarity concept as they both provide 
comprehensive information on particular subjects.  
C. NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION THREAT INTELLIGENCE 
CONSORTIUM 
1. Structure 
The National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium (NTIC), formerly the 
Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center, is the region’s civilian-led fusion center, 
based in the District of Columbia’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
Agency.200 Created in 2019, NTIC supports situational awareness and decision-making by 
producing analytical intelligence products that serve several disciplines.201 Additionally, 
NTIC sub-divides its missions into four fields: the public, executive leadership, critical 
infrastructure partners, and first responders.202 The list of products include the following: 
∑ Impact assessments  
∑ Threat assessments 
 
200 District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency and National Capital 
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201 District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency and National Capital 
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Region Threat Intelligence Consortium, 5. 
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∑ Intelligence bulletins 
∑ Intelligence assessments 
∑ Cyber advisories 
∑ Officer safety bulletins 
∑ First responder awareness bulletins 
Notably, while the Washington Regional Threat Analysis Center previously authored a 
publication called Fire Watch, similar information now appears in first responder 
awareness bulletins. Moreover, all of the publications listed are available to the fire service.  
2. Strategic-Level Intelligence 
At the strategic level, the vast array of NTIC’s products makes them suitable for 
executive-level decision-makers. In 2020, NTIC developed a comprehensive threat 
assessment that covers a wide spectrum of threats to the homeland. The document identifies 
numerous threats and hazards as well as highlights the risk attributes thereof. Additionally, 
the document qualifies the threats based on a risk scale of high, medium, or low and offers 
critical judgments to guide strategic-level thinking and policymaking. Finally, NTIC has 
created a standing information-needs product, which highlights various topics that 
executive personnel may require for planning purposes. Having such information allows 
policymakers to analyze the inspirational materials to identify other potential risks or 
request additional intelligence to make better judgments. Ultimately, NTIC’s product line 
has a tremendous amount of information to guide strategic thought at the highest levels of 
the agency.  
3. Operational-Level Intelligence 
Intelligence products developed by NTIC offer insight for middle managers and 
their operational outlook. An example of this is manifest in the intelligence assessment 
products, which offer perspectives regarding the issue at hand and further delineate an 
outlook based on what operational decision-makers may expect. Alternatively, NTIC’s 
intelligence bulletins highlight emerging issues in homeland security with actions that 
operational personnel may take to mitigate such threats. Additionally, the intelligence 
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bulletin identifies recent incidents associated with the issue to give decision-makers a better 
perspective. Finally, NTIC’s impact assessments detail findings involving specific events 
in the National Capital Region and identify key findings, previously known incidents 
surrounding similar events, and an operational outlook with several indicators to guide 
supervisory and management personnel in managing such events. Overall, NTIC 
intelligence products are a noteworthy source for operational-level intelligence.  
4. Tactical-Level Intelligence  
At the tactical level, NTIC produces various advisories and safety bulletins for 
response-level personnel. For instance, NTIC produces situational awareness bulletins on 
trending topics in homeland security, as they may eventually make their way into the 
jurisdiction. NTIC analyzes DHS reports to identify developing threats and potential 
targets for such dangers. Additionally, NTIC creates officer safety bulletins to warn law 
enforcement officers of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by adversaries to harm 
uniformed personnel. Furthermore, the tactical-level reports identify intelligence gaps 
where line personnel may assist with gathering field-level intelligence. Moreover, NTIC 
offers a product called a sunrise brief, which details tactical-level information to guide 
day-to-day decisions. Finally, NTIC offers cyber advisories to inform personnel on how to 
protect their privacy and information systems from cyber-attackers. Generally, NTIC 
products offer a good level of detail to inform the decision-making of tactical, line-level 
supervisors and managers.  
5. Analytical Value 
Intelligence products from NTIC offer an abundance of analytical value at multiple 
levels. First, there are key findings and judgments, which highlight important aspects of 
homeland security issues along with the associated risk level. Second, the products identify 
intelligence gaps, so policymakers understand that the provided intelligence remains 
incomplete for the most accurate policy determinations. Also, some intelligence products 
give issues context and an outlook on how they may affect operations. Moreover, some 
products detail specific safety concerns, access and egress points, and incident command 
structure and coordination. Furthermore, many of the bulletins contain direct comments 
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from analysts who provide more detailed analysis to improve sense-making for 
practitioners. Finally, NTIC develops security and preparedness packets on emerging 
threats and trends for issues such as school safety, campus safety, and human trafficking. 
The preparedness packets offer a broader view of a topic, as well as detailed steps an 
organization may take to mitigate, respond to, and recover from such instances. Despite 
the numerous publications, NTIC products offer a wealth of analysis, which serves to 
inform operational and policy decisions. 
6. Lowenthal’s Intelligence Framework 
The products available to DCFEMS through NTIC meet Lowenthal’s framework 
with varying degrees. The impact, threat, and intelligence assessments are timely at the 
strategic level. Likewise, the cyber advisories are timely at the operational level. Also, the 
intelligence bulletins, officer safety bulletins, and first responder safety bulletins are timely 
at the tactical level. The only fire service–tailored product offered by NTIC is the first 
responder awareness bulletin, with the rest of the product line being general or law 
enforcement in nature. The tactical-level bulletins are all digestible, with many limited to 
one or two pages. Finally, the entire product line provides clarity on knowns and unknowns, 
as NTIC provides a high level of analysis.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Chicago Fire Department, the New York City Fire Department, and the District 
of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department were three of the earliest 
proponents of the fire service’s integration and engagement in the intelligence enterprise. 
Accordingly, the three case studies offer insight into the value that fire service agencies 
bring to the intelligence community generally and state and local intelligence efforts more 
specifically. Although their intelligence practices began internally, their proficiency and 
dedication have led to partnerships with fusion centers, law enforcement, DHS, and a host 
of other intelligence agencies. The intelligence products circulated by the three 
departments are unique and serve a larger audience than the fire service.  
Structurally, the FDNY’s CDTP remains an anomaly by maintaining a separate 
intelligence function within the department. Conversely, Chicago Fire and DCFEMS both 
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integrate, to some extent, with local fusion centers. The Chicago Fire Department’s TOIC 
integrates and coordinates with the Chicago Police Department’s Crime Prevention and 
Information Center while DCFEMS integrates and collaborates with the National Capital 
Region Threat Intelligence Consortium. The differing levels of integration show that fire 
service intelligence processes can work in different configurations. Strategically, 
operationally, and tactically, all three organizations produce quality intelligence products. 
Still, the lack of analytical input by TOIC makes it a less valuable source than the FDNY 
or DCFEMS. Analytically, the intelligence products developed by the FDNY and 
DCFEMS through NTIC are of high quality, depending on the particular intelligence 
product.  
The case studies offered in this chapter bring to light several significant outcomes 
for consideration. First, despite the lack of trust in fire service intelligence capabilities after 
9/11, several agencies have shown the value of including the fire service in intelligence 
processes. Second, fire service agencies have proven they are capable of developing 
intelligence products to inform strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making. Also, 
the fire service continues to improve its intelligence analysis, which may broaden the 
perspective of intelligence products. Additionally, the case studies demonstrate that fire 
service integration into the intelligence community is possible and practical. Finally, the 
varying styles and lengths of fire service intelligence products may serve as templates for 
other IC agencies in developing products tailored to meet the needs of the fire service.  
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V. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter I offered a problem statement, a review of relevant literature, and identified 
two related research questions. Chapter II discussed gaps in fire service intelligence 
support, techniques, and procedures by conducting a gap analysis through a survey 
instrument. Chapter III identified current intelligence processes, including policies and 
practices specific to the fire service. Chapter IV analyzed available fire service intelligence 
products to identify best practices in product design. This chapter serves to tie the 
information from the previous chapters together. It first discusses successful aspects of fire 
service intelligence processes. Next, it treats aspects requiring change or improvement. 
Then, it answers the research questions and draws conclusions from the research. Finally, 
the chapter ends with a list of recommendations to improve fire service intelligence 
processes to inform strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making.  
A. DISCUSSION 
This thesis examined the state of current fire service intelligence practices to 
identify the gaps that limit the use of intelligence for direct strategic, operational, and 
tactical support. This thesis used a survey instrument that asked current fire service 
members about intelligence in the fire service to identify strengths and weaknesses in 
intelligence practices. The survey consisted of three demographic questions, followed by 
12 intelligence-specific questions. The results of the survey indicate that some intelligence 
practices work well while others need considerable work.  
1. Demographics 
Respondents represented career, volunteer, and combination departments, as well 
as a state fire academy, a paid on-call agency, and a state forestry agency. Additionally, 
respondents represented various sized fire departments from every geographic region in 
the United States. Because this thesis has attempted to identify shortcomings in fire service 
intelligence practices as a whole, representation from different types, sizes, and geographic 
regions best supports the development of solutions that a majority of departments can use. 
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2. Intelligence Practices: Successful Aspects 
The survey data reveal that several intelligence practices are going well. First, a 
significant majority of participants reported receiving intelligence from at least one source, 
with several receiving intelligence from multiple sources. The most highly recognized 
sources were state or local fusion centers, police intelligence units, the Homeland Security 
Information Network, and JTTFs. To a lesser extent, others noted that their agencies use 
internally created intelligence, arson task forces, TRIPwire, the Bomb and Arson Tracking 
System, and the Interagency Fire Intelligence Exchange. These findings challenge the work 
of earlier researchers who suggested that the fire service lacks access to intelligence 
products because of a lack of security clearances or other reasons.203 The findings matter 
because fire service agencies need access to intelligence to inform decision-making at all 
levels of their organizations.  
Second, several participants highlighted successful integration by their agencies 
with their state or local fusion centers, with some having a fire service representative or 
terrorism liaison officer assigned as well. Accordingly, some participants stated that their 
integration is robust, and their agencies receive frequent updates. Although integration 
remains fragmented, the numbers are promising for further improvements. Pinpointing 
instances of successful integration challenges the assumption that the fire service does not 
have a place in the overall intelligence enterprise. Additionally, 88.24 percent of 
participants found that the intelligence received is of some value, despite survey data that 
reveal 52 percent of fire agencies perceive that intelligence providers are unaware of fire 
service intelligence needs. The finding reinforces the importance of the intelligence cycle 
and that consumers must identify their intelligence requirements. Otherwise, intelligence 
providers base their assessments on guesses and prior production history.  
3. Intelligence Practices: Areas for Improvement 
On the other hand, barriers to information sharing persist within fire service 
agencies and between their law enforcement counterparts. Internally, fire service agencies 
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tend to withhold information from the rank and file, disseminating it only to high-ranking 
personnel. Similarly, some suggest that intelligence dissemination occurs on a 
need-to-know basis, instead of using the need-to-share doctrine. Still, others mention a lack 
of dissemination of intelligence within their departments. Regarding law enforcement, 
many survey participants note the lack of trust between the fire service and law 
enforcement as an important information-sharing barrier. The problem endures despite 
several guidance documents recognizing the fire service as an equal and fully trusted 
partner.204 Additionally, fire service agencies advise that they do not receive the same type 
of intelligence as law enforcement, suggesting its lower value to decision-makers. 
Ultimately, the lack of information sharing within fire service agencies and between law 
enforcement severely limits fire service activities regarding homeland security issues. 
An additional weakness is that fire service interaction with fusion centers remains 
fragmented. Over 34 percent of the participants in the survey reported little to no interaction 
or integration with their state or local fusion centers. In particular, participants from 
Washington State and New York acknowledged that the fire service is left out of the 
information-sharing loop altogether. Still, others stated that their fusion centers deal mainly 
with criminal issues such as drug trafficking. Moreover, some participants concluded that 
a lack of interest among fire chiefs and trouble staffing representatives in fusion centers 
limit sharing. Furthermore, the PESTEL analysis reveals that legal frameworks in some 
states prohibit information sharing with the fire service. This is despite the high interest of 
the fire service to engage in intelligence activities and the proliferation of numerous 
guidance documents by DHS and the DOJ. These findings have important implications for 
the broader domain of information sharing because fusion centers are the conduit between 
the intelligence community and state and local first response agencies.  
4. Intelligence Practices: Critical Improvement Areas 
The most critical issues for information sharing are law enforcement collaboration, 
intelligence requirements, handling of sensitive information, and finished intelligence. As 
a result of the study, the fire service overwhelmingly suggests that intelligence and 
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operational planning must be a collaborative effort. Numerous participants proposed 
reserving a seat at the table for fire service agencies to engage in intelligence and 
information-sharing initiatives. Furthermore, participants suggested tying in intelligence 
activities with integrated response planning for events that may affect the jurisdiction. 
Additionally, participants recommended establishing joint information-sharing portals, so 
law enforcement, fire, and EMS might have a common operating picture when planning 
for and responding to incidents involving joint operations. Still, others advised that the fire 
service offers a unique perspective that may be beneficial in developing a clearer threat 
picture and a better-informed operational plan.  
The issue of fire service intelligence requirements has several interrelated concerns. 
First, fire service agencies have argued that the intelligence they receive lacks relevance, 
timeliness, and coordination between fire and law enforcement agencies. Second, 
participants claimed that intelligence agencies are not aware of fire service intelligence 
needs. These claims are of some concern because they shed light on misperceptions within 
the fire service regarding intelligence requirements. The fire service must establish and 
submit its requirements to intelligence agencies for the information to be relevant to the 
fire service. Additionally, the survey reveals some confusion concerning the intelligence 
requirements for standing information needs and the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels. When responding to four survey questions regarding standing information needs, 
strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, and tactical intelligence, respondents 
offered similar answers for each. Given some overlap, agencies should expect some 
duplication, yet distinctions at each level seem to be confusing to the participants. Despite 
the confusion, participants identified several intelligence requirements related to the fire 
service. The following section identifies the specific requirements suggested by the 
participants.  
Another concern is the lack of understanding handling requirements for sensitive 
information, as many agencies do not have an information security officer position. Several 
participants highlighted security concerns over the leaking of sensitive information to the 
general public. One participant pointed out that from practical experience, firefighters lack 
an understanding of handling requirements and fail to protect sensitive information. Other 
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participants suggested a need for training on the meanings of control markings and the 
development of policies for handling sensitive information. Ultimately, improving the 
understanding and enforcement of handling requirements may improve the level of trust 
between the fire service and law enforcement agencies.  
Regarding the use of finished intelligence, participants identified several 
shortcomings in the survey. First, participants acknowledged that fire service members 
need additional training in how to understand, interpret, and act on intelligence. Second, 
participants suggested that often there is an overabundance of information given that 
drowns out the more pertinent details. Additionally, participants pointed out a need to 
practice utilizing intelligence in training scenarios to improve understanding. Furthermore, 
participants recognized that without knowing how to use intelligence, fire personnel may 
respond blindly to incidents that have grave consequences. Notably, these findings suggest 
that not knowing how to use intelligence is just as bad as not receiving any.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis aimed to answer two specific fire service intelligence questions. First, 
this thesis sought to determine fire service intelligence requirements to provide direct 
support to inform strategies, operations, and tactics. Second, this thesis used a survey 
instrument, completed by members of the fire service, to identify standing information 
needs and strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level intelligence requirements. The results 
of the survey follow.  
1. Standing Information Needs/Requirements 
Participants in the survey identified several standing information needs for 
efficient, effective, and safe operations of the fire service daily. According to the 
Department of Justice, “SINs [standing information needs] help focus intelligence 
gathering, analysis, and reporting on those topics or issues of most concern to the entity 
that defines them.”205 Additionally, the Department of Justice suggests, “SINs are the 
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enduring subjects of intelligence or operational interest for an entity or jurisdiction.”206 The 
following is a compilation of standing information needs highlighted in the survey. 
∑ Specific and credible threats against first responders 
∑ Suspicious activity in a given area 
∑ Sovereign Citizen movements 
∑ Prior law enforcement interaction with bomb-making materials 
∑ Information of issues or events that may alter response routing 
∑ Known cyber activity that may target fire department information systems 
∑ Human smuggling operations within the jurisdiction 
∑ Information on the spread of pandemics and necessary precautions 
∑ Specific, credible threats to businesses and critical infrastructure 
∑ Arson-related activity, trends, and tactics 
∑ Social media references to terrorist or dangerous criminal activity 
∑ Large-scale events within the jurisdiction 
∑ Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive hazards or 
threats within the jurisdiction 
∑ Theft of fire service equipment, vehicles, and uniforms 
∑ Extremist groups that may be traveling to the area 
∑ Information on known illicit drug laboratories 
∑ Civil unrest, protests, rioting, protest devices, barricaded/blocked streets 
∑ Extreme weather events and other potential natural disasters 
∑ School and active-shooter threats or indicators 
∑ Indicators of pre-attack operational surveillance 
∑ Locations of properties storing hazardous materials 
∑ Gang activity that may pose a threat to first responders 
 
206 Department of Homeland Security, 21. 
77 
2. Strategic Intelligence Requirements 
Strategic intelligence looks at long-term issues that may affect how an organization 
plans for the future. Participants in the survey identified numerous requirements to support 
strategic planning and decision-making. The following is a compilation of strategic 
intelligence requirements participants emphasized in the survey. 
∑ Emergent groups that may pose a threat to first responders 
∑ Identification of known and potential targets in the jurisdiction  
∑ Threats or issues that may affect ongoing resource allocations 
∑ Critical infrastructure and key resource threat assessments 
∑ Cyber events such as swatting, doxing, and denial of service attacks that 
target response agencies 
∑ Emergent threats, along with potential actions to counter the threats and 
guide strategic planning 
∑ Trends on tactics, techniques, procedures, and the context for which they 
are in use overseas that may eventually threaten the homeland 
∑ Criminal and terrorist modus operandi that may drive decisions for 
equipment purchases, training, and long-range planning 
∑ High-level briefings on world political events and how they may affect the 
homeland 
∑ Evaluation of potential threats versus response capabilities 
3. Operational Intelligence Requirements 
Operational intelligence looks at the information needed for short- to mid-term 
issues that may affect agency operations. Fire service agencies utilize operational 
intelligence to plan operations; monitor events; match capabilities to the threat; provide 
relevant, timely, and credible assessments; and monitor natural or human-made 
disasters.207 Participants in the survey identified numerous requirements to support 
 
207 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, Intelligence Guide, I-22. 
78 
operational planning and decision-making. The following is a compilation of operational 
intelligence requirements participants emphasized in the survey. 
∑ Threats to first responders 
∑ Threats to target hazards, critical infrastructure, and key resources 
∑ Pre-incident information that may guide unified command operations 
∑ Geographic information system mapping and plume data  
∑ Specific risks, threats, and methods  
∑ Intelligence that informs short-term planning objectives, training 
activities, and equipment purchases 
∑ Current issues that may warrant the alteration of response plans and routes 
∑ Known threats and hazards for pre-planning mitigation and response 
∑ Availability of special resources 
∑ Special event threat assessments 
∑ Information on extremist groups in the jurisdiction, along with their plans 
4. Tactical Intelligence Requirements 
Tactical intelligence is perishable intelligence that supports current tactical 
operations and keeps personnel out of danger. Tactical intelligence must be accurate, 
relevant, timely, and precise, with detailed information on who, what, when, where, and 
how.208 Participants in the survey identified numerous requirements to support tactical 
decision-making. The following is a compilation of tactical intelligence requirements 
participants emphasized in the survey. 
∑ Information on known, credible threats for incidents to which first 
responders will respond 
∑ Immediate known threats to personnel safety, such as civil unrest, known 
chemical agents, and bomb-making materials 
∑ Information on active-shooter or bomb threat incidents 
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∑ Real-time threat-related information, safe response routes, and secured 
staging areas 
∑ Intelligence based on incident indicators such as plumes, fumes, or odors 
that may indicate WMD materials 
∑ Cyber threats 
∑ Real-time information on complex-coordinated attacks 
∑ Public health issues and force protection methods 
∑ Impending severe weather and other natural disasters 
∑ Pre-attack indicators, materials involved, actions to take 
∑ Daily intelligence briefs 
5. Using Finished Intelligence 
Additionally, this thesis sought to determine how the fire service can use 
intelligence to guide strategic policy development, operational planning, and tactical 
decision-making. Second, this thesis used a survey instrument, completed by members of 
the fire service, to identify current fire service uses of intelligence to support daily 
operations. Furthermore, this thesis compared intelligence products from three agencies 
that develop fire-based intelligence products. The results of the survey and comparative 
analysis follow. 
a. Strategic Level 
At the strategic level, fire service agencies use intelligence for long-term strategic 
planning. Using the intelligence to inform strategic planning allows for adjustments to 
staffing models, standards of cover, and standard operating guidelines. Additionally, 
strategic intelligence drives equipment purchases, so fire agencies can match their 
capabilities to acknowledged threats. Moreover, strategic intelligence allows fire agencies 
to develop training plans to ensure personnel receive the training necessary to counter 
emergent threats. Finally, strategic intelligence aids fire agencies in developing prevention, 
mitigation, and long-term recovery strategies. Ultimately, strategic intelligence looks at 
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long-range issues that may affect how an organization plans or operates based on future-
oriented events. 
b. Operational Level 
At the operational level, fire service agencies use intelligence in various ways. First, 
fire agencies use operational intelligence to develop operational plans for special events 
and large-scale incidents. Second, agencies use operational intelligence to advise and report 
on suspicious activities. Additionally, operational intelligence aids in identifying threat-
based staffing needs and recalling personnel with specialized knowledge. Finally, agencies 
use operational intelligence to inform personnel about novel issues, such as new street 
drugs and their attendant effects or pandemic information for COVID-19 and the associated 
personal protective equipment requirements. In the end, operational intelligence looks at 
the information needed for short- to mid-term issues that may affect agency operations.  
c. Tactical Level 
At the tactical level, fire service agencies use intelligence for force protection 
activities. Force protection takes several forms, such as providing general situational 
awareness, changing response routing, or responding to a staging area until dispatchers 
declare the scene safe for entry. Additionally, tactical intelligence can inform response 
personnel to remain observant of threatening individuals or groups. Also, the intelligence 
may prompt response personnel to remain vigilant in identifying anomalies in their 
response districts for SARs. Furthermore, tactical intelligence may inform of the need to 
increase station security levels due to a known threat or in times of civil unrest. Finally, 
tactical intelligence can notify personnel of real-time issues such as addresses with known 
hazards or threats, or real-time movements of protest groups, so companies can avoid 
ambushes and identify alternate response routes. Ultimately, tactical intelligence is 
perishable and supports current tactical deployments to resolve incidents while effectively 
keeping response personnel out of danger. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
According to Thomas Robson, “The ability of the fire service to execute its sworn 
duty to protect life and property in the local community, as well as, to the extent possible, 
protect the firefighters who serve there from the consequences of terrorism, is dependent 
on the efficient usage of intelligence.”209 As such, the fire service has intelligence to 
support mission-critical decisions at all levels of the organizations. More specifically, 
intelligence aims to inform long-range strategic planning, gain an understanding of threats 
and their implications for the organization, and protect the lives of personnel operating on 
the ground. Given the importance of intelligence, this thesis outlines recommendations for 
the three most critical issues identified in the survey and analysis of professed intelligence 
problems: intelligence requirements, handling of sensitive information, and more effective 
law enforcement collaboration in developing intelligence products.  
1. Identify and distribute a list of baseline fire service intelligence 
requirements. 
The International Association of Fire Chiefs should identify and distribute a list of 
baseline fire service intelligence requirements to all fire service organizations for 
submission to their intelligence producers. Intelligence producers in the intelligence 
community acknowledge that intelligence consumers have diverse intelligence needs, and 
the fire service is no different. Accordingly, fire service leaders require personalized, well-
timed intelligence that identifies threat-based risks, background and contextual analysis, 
and warnings to perform their duties and protect their personnel effectively. However, the 
results of the survey suggest there is confusion in the fire service regarding who sets and 
communicates the requirements to intelligence producers. In short, fire service leaders and 
policymakers should identify and establish their own requirements and send them to their 
intelligence producers. If fire service leaders do not convey requirements to their 
producers, the producers will set priorities based on their knowledge, and the intelligence 
may lack relevance to the fire service.  
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2. Develop a training brief and policy guidance on intelligence handling 
requirements and operational security. 
DHS and the Department of Justice should develop a training brief and policy 
guidance on intelligence handling requirements and operational security. According to the 
Defense Security Service, “Marking is the principal way of letting holders of information 
know the specific protection requirements for that information.”210 Additionally, the 
agency suggests there are several purposes for understanding intelligence markings and 
handling requirements. More specifically, intelligence markings alert the holder to 
potentially sensitive information, indicate how to protect it, and offer guidance on how to 
safely share it. Accordingly, numerous participants suggested that the handling of sensitive 
information is an area of concern for the fire service. Many of the participants advised that 
they were unfamiliar with terms such as For Official Use Only and the associated 
requirements for safeguarding the information.  
Additionally, participants mentioned that fire service agencies tend to share 
information more broadly as opposed to the closely guarded treatment by law enforcement. 
Furthermore, participants mentioned that the differences in sharing and safeguarding are a 
point of contention for improved information sharing between the two disciplines. 
Therefore, a detailed training plan and policy guidance document are necessary to educate 
fire service members on intelligence restrictions, and doing so may improve information 
sharing between fire and their law enforcement counterparts. Also, fire service agencies 
would benefit from establishing an information security officer, similar to a Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act compliance officer, to ensure the agency 
meets intelligence-handling guidelines. 
3. Develop a joint intelligence guide for use by fire, law enforcement, 
EMS, and other first response agencies.  
DHS, the Department of Justice, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police should develop a joint intelligence guide 
for use by fire, law enforcement, EMS, and other first response agencies. Many of the 
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participants in the survey suggested that there is a need for more collaboration with law 
enforcement for intelligence processes and planning. As such, a joint intelligence doctrine 
may prove beneficial. The Department of Defense suggests that accomplishing missions 
relies on joint intelligence.211 More specifically, the purpose of joint intelligence is to 
“inform the commanders; identify, define, and nominate objectives; support the planning 
and execution of operations; counter adversary deception and surprise; support friendly 
deception efforts; and assess the effects of operations on the adversary.”212 Additionally, 
intelligence informs decision-making by highlighting paths of action and allows for 
prediction and anticipation of future events.213 Ultimately, the joint intelligence doctrine 
has proven beneficial to the military, and adoption by fire and law enforcement agencies 
may be as valuable. this research points to the need for such a guide. Although the guide 
itself is beyond the scope of this thesis due to CUI restrictions, a proposed outline is 
provided in Appendix B, and the author intends to develop the guide as a separate project. 
In sum, identifying and distributing baseline intelligence requirements to fire 
service agencies will ensure the timeliness and relevance of intelligence in supporting 
decision-making at all levels of fire service organizations. Also, training on handling 
sensitive information and the development of internal security policies may eliminate 
barriers to information sharing between the fire service and law enforcement. Finally, 
developing a joint planning doctrine and guide will allow for more effective coordination 
and collaboration at the local level to ensure the completion of homeland security missions 
in the most effective and efficient ways possible. As a follow-on to this thesis, I intend to 
develop a detailed requirements list and draft a joint intelligence guide for dissemination 
to intelligence agencies for further development and distribution to associated agencies.  
  
 
211 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, I-3. 
212 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, Intelligence Guide, ix. 
213 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, ix. 
84 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
85 
APPENDIX A.  FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
The fire service has a wide range of intelligence needs to support strategic, 
operational, and tactical decision-making. Establishing intelligence requirements is the 
first step in the intelligence cycle. The fire service must establish and submit its 
requirements to intelligence agencies for the information to bear relevance. Given that 
intelligence needs vary based on jurisdiction, this list is not meant to be exhaustive. 
However, the list sets itself apart from others as it highlights intelligence requirements at 
four levels: standing information needs, strategic requirements, operational requirements, 
and tactical requirements. For a more comprehensive list of fire service or homeland 
security–related intelligence requirements, DHS and the FSIE offer guides on key 
intelligence questions that may serve the basis for establishing requirements.  
A. STANDING INFORMATION NEEDS/REQUIREMENTS 
Standing information needs are a key component for efficient, effective, and safe 
operations of the fire service daily. According to the Department of Justice, “SINs help 
focus intelligence gathering, analysis, and reporting on those topics or issues of most 
concern to the entity that defines them.”214 Additionally, the Department of Justice 
suggests, “SINs are the enduring subjects of intelligence or operational interest for an entity 
or jurisdiction.”215 The following is a compilation of standing information needs 
highlighted by fire service members in this thesis.  
∑ Specific and credible threats against first responders 
∑ Suspicious activity in a given area 
∑ Sovereign Citizen movements 
∑ Prior law enforcement interaction with bomb-making materials 
∑ Information of issues or events that may alter response routing 
∑ Known cyber activity that may target fire department information systems 
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∑ Human smuggling operations within the jurisdiction 
∑ Information on the spread of pandemics and necessary precautions 
∑ Specific, credible threats to businesses and critical infrastructure 
∑ Arson-related activity, trends, and tactics 
∑ Social media references to terrorist or dangerous criminal activity 
∑ Large-scale events within the jurisdiction 
∑ Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive hazards or 
threats within the jurisdiction 
∑ Theft of fire service equipment, vehicles, and uniforms 
∑ Extremist groups that may be traveling to the area 
∑ Information on known, illicit drug laboratories 
∑ Civil unrest, protests, rioting, protest devices, barricaded/blocked streets 
∑ Extreme weather events and other potential natural disasters 
∑ School and active-shooter threats or indicators 
∑ Indicators of pre-attack operational surveillance 
∑ Locations of properties storing hazardous materials 
∑ Gang activity that may pose a threat to first responders 
B. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
Strategic intelligence looks at long-range issues that may affect how an 
organization plans for the future. Participants in the survey identified numerous 
requirements to support strategic planning and decision-making. The following is a 
compilation of strategic intelligence requirements participants emphasized in the survey. 
∑ Emergent groups that may pose a threat to first responders 
∑ Identification of known and potential targets in the jurisdiction  
∑ Threats or issues that may affect ongoing resource allocations 
∑ Critical infrastructure and key resources threat assessments 
∑ Cyber events such as swatting, doxing, and denial of service attacks that 
target response agencies 
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∑ Emergent threats, along with potential actions to counter the threats and 
guide strategic planning 
∑ Trends on tactics, techniques, procedures, and the context for which they 
are in use overseas that may eventually threaten the homeland 
∑ Criminal and terrorist modus operandi that may drive decisions for 
equipment purchases, training, and long-range planning 
∑ High-level briefings on world political events and how they may affect the 
homeland 
∑ Evaluation of potential threats versus response capabilities 
C. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
Operational intelligence looks at the information needed for short- to mid-term 
issues that may affect agency operations. Fire service agencies utilize intelligence to plan 
operations; monitor events; match capabilities to the threat; provide relevant, timely, and 
credible assessments; and monitor natural or human-made disasters.216 Participants in the 
survey identified numerous requirements to support operational planning and decision-
making. The following is a compilation of operational intelligence requirements 
participants emphasized in the survey. 
∑ Threats to first responders 
∑ Threats to target hazards, critical infrastructure, and key resources 
∑ Pre-incident information that may guide unified command operations 
∑ Geographic information system mapping and plume data  
∑ Specific risks, threats, and methods  
∑ Intelligence that informs short-term planning objectives, training 
activities, and equipment purchases 
∑ Current issues that may warrant the alteration of response plans and routes 
∑ Known threats and hazards for pre-planning mitigation and response 
∑ Availability of special resources 
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∑ Special event threat assessments 
∑ Information on extremist groups in the jurisdiction, along with their plans 
D. TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 
Tactical intelligence is perishable intelligence that supports current tactical 
operations and keeps personnel out of danger. Tactical intelligence must be accurate, 
relevant, timely, and precise, with detailed information on who, what, when, where, and 
how.217 Participants in the survey identified numerous requirements to support tactical 
decision-making. The following is a compilation of tactical intelligence requirements 
participants emphasized in the survey. 
∑ Information on known, credible threats for incidents to which first 
responders will respond. 
∑ Immediate known threats to personnel safety, such as civil unrest, known 
chemical agents, and bomb-making materials 
∑ Information on active-shooter or bomb threat incidents 
∑ Real-time threat-related information, safe response routes, and secured 
staging areas 
∑ Intelligence based on incident indicators such as plumes, fumes, or odors 
that may indicate WMD materials 
∑ Cyber threats 
∑ Real-time information on complex-coordinated attacks 
∑ Public health issues and force protection methods 
∑ Impending severe weather and other natural disasters 
∑ Pre-attack indicators, materials involved, actions to take 
∑ Daily intelligence briefs 
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APPENDIX B.  JOINT INTELLIGENCE GUIDE OUTLINE 
In the fire service, there is a need for more collaboration with law enforcement for 
intelligence processes and planning. As such, a joint intelligence doctrine may prove 
beneficial. The Department of Defense suggests that accomplishing missions relies on joint 
intelligence.218 More specifically, the purpose of joint intelligence is to “inform the 
commanders; identify, define, and nominate objectives; support the planning and execution 
of operations; counter adversary deception and surprise; support friendly deception efforts; 
and assess the effects of operations on the adversary.”219 Additionally, intelligence informs 
decision-making by highlighting paths of action and allows for prediction and anticipation 
of future events.220 Ultimately, the joint intelligence doctrine has proven beneficial to the 
military, and adoption by fire and law enforcement agencies may be as valuable. 
Accordingly, the attached outline represents the vision of this thesis for a joint intelligence 
guide for use by first response agencies. 
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First Responder Joint-Intelligence Guide 
 
Executive Summary 
I. What Is Intelligence? 
A. Definition 
B. Principle of Joint Intelligence 
C. Intelligence Types 
1. Open-Source Intelligence  
2. Geospatial Intelligence  
3. Measurements and Signatures Intelligence  
4. Electronic Intelligence 
5. Human Intelligence  
6. Signals Intelligence  
7. Communications Intelligence 
8. Intelligence Cycle 
a) Requirements 
b) Collection 
c) Processing and Exploitation 









10. Intelligence Markings  
a) CNSI: Controlled National Security Information 
b) CUI: Controlled, Unclassified Information 
(1) LES: Law Enforcement Sensitive 
(2) FOUO: For Official Use Only 
c) PII: Personally Identifiable Information 
d) SSI: Sensitive Security Information 
11. Estimative Language 
12. Intelligence Products 
II. Access and Use 
A. Gaining Access to Sensitive Information 
1. Homeland Security Information Network  
2. Technical Resources for Incident Prevention  
3. Regional Information Sharing Systems Network 
4. Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal 
5. Law Enforcement Online  
6. Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise  
7. Interagency Fire Intelligence Exchange 
B. Security Clearances 
1. Levels 
2. Clearance Process 
C. Handling Requirements 
92 
1. Storage 
2. Dissemination Controls 
3. Information Security Officers 
III. Intelligence Support to First Response Organizations 
A. Joint Intelligence Sharing Environment 
1. Memoranda of Understanding 
2. Information-Sharing Architecture 
3. Joint Information-Sharing Systems 
4. Unity of Effort 
5. Concurrent Planning 
6. Need to Share Doctrine 
7. Joint Training and Exercises 




D. Tactical Execution 
1. Initial Phase 
2. Ongoing Phase 

































































































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
135 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Carter, David. Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies., 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2004. 
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/e050919201-IntelGuide_web.pdf. 
Carter, David, Steve Chermak, Jeremy Carter, Jack Drew. Understanding Law 
Enforcement Intelligence Processes: Report to the Office of University Programs, 
Science and Technology Directorate. College Park, MD: National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2014. https://www.start.umd.
edu/pubs/START_UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_
July2014.pdf. 
Castro Garcia, Andres de, Florina Cristiana Matei, and Thomas C. Bruneau. “Combatting 
Terrorism through Fusion Centers: Useful Lessons from Other Experiences?” 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 4 (2017): 
723–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2017.1297119. 
Center for Development of Security Excellence. Marking Classified Information Job Aid. 
Linthicum, MD: Defense Security Service, 2017. 
Central Intelligence Agency. “INTelligence: Signals Intelligence.” Last updated April 30, 
2013. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-
featured-story-archive/intelligence-signals-intelligence-1.html. 
Chapman, Robert, Shelly Baker, Veh Bezdikian, Pam Cammarata, Debra Cohen, Nancy 
Leach, Amy Schapiro, Matthew Scheider, Rita Varano, and Rachel Boba. “Local 
Law Enforcement Responds to Terrorism Lessons in Prevention and 
Preparedness.” COPS Innovations. Last updated April 5, 2002. https://cops.usdoj.
gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0125-pub.pdf. 
Cloud, Rosemary R. “Future Role of Fire Service in Homeland Security.” Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3935. 
Covert, Robert M., II. “Evolving the Local Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise in New 
York State: Implementing a Threat Liaison Officer Program.” Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27813. 
Dahl, Erik J. Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 
9/11 and Beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013. 
Department of Homeland Security. 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final 




———. 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report. Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2016. https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/
oversight-groups/sltps-pac/national-network-of-fusion-centers-2015.pdf. 
———. Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise: Concept Plan. Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, August 2009. 
———. Safeguarding Classified and Sensitive but Unclassified Information: Reference 
Booklet for State, Local, Tribal and Private Sector Programs. Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2005. https://homeport.uscg.mil/Lists/
Content/Attachments/2110/SecurityReferenceStateLocalTribalPrivateSector.pdf. 
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice. “Case Study: Crime 
Prevention and Information Center.” Washington, DC: National Criminal 
Intelligence Resource Center, November 2007.  
———. “Fire Service Information Sharing Workshop: Fusion Center Resource.” 
Washington, DC: National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, September 
2010.  
Department of Justice. “Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.” 
Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2010. 
Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security. Fusion Center Guidelines: 
Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era. Washington, 
DC: Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security, 2006. 
https://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/d/fusion_center_guidelines.pdf. 
District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency and 
National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium. Emerging Incident 
Playbook. Shawnee, KS: Guest Communications Corporation, 2019. 
Executive Office of the President. National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes 
and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing. 
Washington, DC: White House, 2007. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/
a473664.pdf. 
German, Michael. What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers. New York: American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2007. https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_
20071212.pdf. 
Goldstein, Scott E. “Comparative Analysis of Fusion Center Outreach to Fire and EMS 
Agencies.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. http://hdl.handle.
net/10945/47952. 
137 
Gonzales, Rebecca L. “Transforming Executive Fire Officers: A Paradigm Shift to Meet 
the Intelligence Needs of the 21st Century Fire Service.” Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5157. 
Harrison, Kevin. “Improving Information Sharing in the NYC Emergency Response 
Community.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018. https://www.
hsdl.org/?view&did=814723. 
Heirston, Bryan. “Terrorism Prevention and Firefighters: Where Are the Information-
Sharing Boundaries?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4930. 
Henke, Keith. “Fire Service Intel and Info Resources.” Presentation, Department of 
Homeland Security, November 2019. 
Homeland Security Advisory Council. “Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: 
Homeland Security Intelligence & Information Fusion.” Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2005. 
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group. Intelligence Guide for First 
Responders. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2011. https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo12126/ITACG_Guide_
for_First_Responders_2011.pdf. 
International Association of Fire Chiefs. Homeland Security: Intelligence Guide for Fire 
Chiefs. Fairfax, VA: International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2012. http://the-
security-institute.org/userfiles/file/IntelGuide4FireChiefs.pdf. 
Johnson, Loch K., and James J. Wirtz, eds. Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An 
Anthology. 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Intelligence. JP 2-0. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2007. 
Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team. JCAT Intelligence Guide for First Responders. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2015. 
https://www.dni.gov/nctc/jcat/jcat_ctguide/intel_guide.html. 
Jurevicius, Ovidijus. “PEST & PESTEL Analysis.” Strategic Management Insight, 
February 13, 2013. https://www.strategicmanagementinsight.com/tools/pest-
pestel-analysis.html. 
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 7th ed. Los Angeles: CQ 
Press, 2017. 
138 
Minks, Cody. “Hacking the Silos: Eliminating Information Barriers between Public 
Health and Law Enforcement.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58345. 
Monahan, Torin, and Neal A. Palmer. “The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers.” 
Security Dialogue 40, no. 6 (2009): 617–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0967010609350314. 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004. https://digital.
library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc123526/. 
New York City Fire Department, Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness. 
“Watchline: FDNY’s Flagship Intelligence Product.” Presentation, New York 
City Fire Department, February 8, 2018. 
Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security. Washington, 
DC: White House, 2002. ProQuest. 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2018 Information Sharing Environment. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018. 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/2018_Information_Sharing_
Environment_Annual_Report.pdf. 
———. Domestic Approach to National Intelligence. Washington, DC: Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2016. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/DomesticApproachtoNationalIntelligence.PDF. 
———. “What We Do.” Accessed April 17, 2020. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-
we-do. 
Offices of the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of 
Homeland Security, and Department of Justice. Review of Domestic Sharing of 
Counterterrorism Information. Washington, DC: Inspectors General of the 
Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of 
Justice, March 2017. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Domestic_
Sharing_Counterterrorism_Information_Report.pdf. 
Peterson, Marilyn. Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture. NCJ 
210681. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005. https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf. 
139 
Pfeifer, Joseph W., Sean S. Newman, John M. Esposito, Thomas J. Currao, Timothy A. 
Carroll, Christopher Flatley, Christopher P. Ward, Mark A. Donohue, Michael 
Gomez, and Kristin Eng. FDNY Counterterrorism and Risk Management 
Strategy. Edited by Janet Kimmerly. New York: New York City Fire Department, 
2011. https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/fdny/downloads/pdf/FDNY_ct_strategy_
2011_12.pdf. 
Regan, Priscilla M., and Torin Monahan. “Beyond Counterterrorism: Data Sharing, 
Privacy, and Organizational Histories of DHS Fusion Centers.” International 
Journal of E-Politics 4, no. 3 (2013): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.4018/jep.
2013070101. 
Regan, Priscilla M., Torin Monahan, and Krista Craven. “Constructing the Suspicious: 
Data Production, Circulation, and Interpretation by DHS Fusion Centers.” 
Administration & Society 47, no. 6 (2015): 740–62. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0095399713513141. 
Richardson, Thomas J. “Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to 
First Responders in the Fire and EMS Services.” Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5137. 
Robson, Thomas A. “A Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in 
the Fire Service.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. http://hdl.
handle.net/10945/4913. 
Russo, Joseph. “Out from Under the Rock: Improving FDNY Information Sharing.” 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/
10945/53042. 
Salvatore, Shane A. “Fusion Center Challenges: Why Fusion Centers Have Failed to 
Meet Intelligence Sharing Expectations.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58358. 
Smartsheet. “The Complete Guide to Gap Analysis.” Accessed February 24, 2020. 
https://www.smartsheet.com/gap-analysis-method-examples.  
Warner, Michael. “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence.’” Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 
3 (2002). 
Zegart, Amy B. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007. 
  
140 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
141 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
